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INTRODUCTION
On January 8, 2011, Jared Lee Loughner unleashed tragedy on a na-
tion with a shooting rampage in Tucson, Arizona. In a matter of minutes,
Loughner killed six people, including a federal judge, and injured thirteen
others, including a congresswoman.' Following this scene of devastation,
legal attention turned to who would represent Loughner and what
Loughner's defense would be. Evidence showed that the troubled Loughner
had long planned his highly public acts, and he disclosed no remorse. Social
outrage was huge, Loughner's legal options limited.2 Yet, predictions for a
defense surfaced: Loughner's attorneys would likely scrutinize Loughner's
life and lineage across generations in an effort to garner him an insanity
defense or avoid the death penalty.' Indeed, a few months later, Loughner's
lawyers filed subpoenas for the public health records of twenty-two of
Loughner's relatives on his mother's side, making requests as far back as
1. United States v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 2012); Lane DeGregory,
Glock 19: Quick, Light, Tough, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 14, 2011, at BI. Two months
after the shootings a federal grand jury indicted Loughner for a number of criminal offenses,
including the murder of U.S. District Judge John Roll and the attempted assassination of U.S.
Representative Gabrielle Giffords. Id.; see also Complaint, United States v. Loughner, No.
1 1-0035M (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2011), available at http://documents.nytimes.com/criminal-
complaint-against-jared-lee-loughner. Loughner is represented by, among others, renowned
attorney Judy Clarke. Loughner, 672 F.3d at 735.
2. Marc Lacey, Lawyers for Defendant in Giffords Shooting Seem to Be Searching
for Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, at A13; Dan Nowicki, Why Tucson Shooting Struck
Heart of Nation, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 25, 2011, at Al; Benjamin Weiser, Legal Strategy
Could Hinge on Mental Ills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2011, at A l.
3. Lacey, supra note 2; Weiser, supra note 2. According to death penalty expert
David Bruck, who has worked with Judy Clarke, Loughner's defense "is likely to begin a
far-ranging investigation of [Loughner's] life and family history, going back several genera-
tions to learn as much as possible about his origins, the environment in which he grew up and
how he has functioned in society." Weiser, supra note 2. Updates concerning the defense
strategy indicate that Loughner's attorneys are examining indications of mental illness
among many of Loughner's ancestors. Lacey, supra note 2.
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1893, the year Loughner's maternal great-grandmother was born.4 Presuma-
bly, if Loughner's relatives revealed serious mental and behavioral disor-
ders over the course of a century, such a legacy, along with a distressed
environment, could help explain Loughner's violent propensities and the
need to mitigate his punishment.'
Defense efforts to examine behavioral genetics evidence in criminal
cases are not new, of course. They can be effective but prone to sensational-
ism.6 Recent news articles, for example, have greatly embellished the de-
fense tactics in the trial and sentencing of murderer Bradley Waldroup, giv-
en Waldroup's specific genetic make-up or "warrior gene,"7 as the media
(but no scientist) has dubbed it.8 In 2006, Waldroup brutally killed his
wife's friend and attempted to kill his wife during what the State character-
ized as Waldroup's intentional and premeditated actions spurred by a do-
mestic dispute.9 In the end, Waldroup shot his wife's friend eight times and
slit open her head, then moved on to attack his wife repeatedly with a ma-
chete.'" Waldroup's defense counsel requested that forensic psychiatrist
William Bernet assess Waldroup, only for Bernet to discover that Waldroup
possessed a particular variant of a very rare deficiency of monoamine oxi-
4. Lacey, supra note 2; Katie Moisse, Jared Loughner's Defense Team May Be
Looking for Mental Illness in His Relatives, ABC NEWS, Aug. 19, 2011,
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/MindMoodNews/ ared-loughner-mental-illness-runs-amilies/
story?id=14332522#.T6qKaVLpeMO. It is unclear whether Loughner's lawyers were inves-
tigating his father's lineage as thoroughly. Lacey, supra note 2.
5. Lacey, supra note 2 (According to Professor Christopher Slobogin, "'If the
defense can show that mental illness runs in the family, they have a stronger case, one that is
more convincing to the jury."'). Discussions of an interdisciplinary subject of this sort re-
quire clear terminology, especially because of the close ties between biological and social
factors and the frequent muddling of the terms "biological" and "genetic." In general, social
variables, such as socioeconomic status, consist of environmental influences on a person's
behavior. Jasmine A. Tehrani & Sarnoff A. Mednick, Crime Causation: Biological Theories,
in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 292, 292 (Joshua Dressier et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
Biological variables, on the other hand, constitute "physiological, biochemical, neurological,
and genetic" effects on how an individual may act. Id. Genetic factors are a subset of biolog-
ical variables, distinguishable because they are inherited; in contrast, social factors are not
inherited. Id. All these categories-social, biological, and genetic-are, of course, inter-
related, as this Article emphasizes.
6. See infra notes 7-17, 82-108 and accompanying text.
7. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Can Your Genes Make You Murder?, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO, July 1, 2010, http://www.npr.orgltemplates/story/story.php?storyld=128043329.
8. According to William Bernet, M.D., who evaluated Bradley Waldroup, "The
term 'warrior gene' is media hype. I am not aware of any scientist or forensic expert using
that term." E-mail from William Bernet, M.D., Professor, Department of Psychiatry, Van-
derbilt University School of Medicine, to author (Mar. 25, 2012, 12:52 EST) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Bernet E-mail].
9. State v. Waldroup, No. E2010-01906-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 5051677, at *1-3
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 2, 2012); Hagerty, supra note 7.
10. Waldroup, 2011 WL 5051677, at *1-3; Hagerty, supra note 7.
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dase A (MAOA)." According to Bernet, this deficiency, when added to
Waldroup's history of severe child abuse, "'created a vulnerability that
[Waldroup] would be a violent adult.'" 2 Evidence of this gene-environment
combination in Waldroup's background also proved pivotal to jurors declin-
ing to sentence Waldroup to death. 3 As one juror characterized some of the
jury's deliberations, "'There was more to [Waldroup's] whole life that led
to that moment [of killing].""' 4 When asked if her assessment took into ac-
count Waldroup's genetics, she responded, "'Oh I'm sure ... And his back-
ground--nature vs. nurture." 5
Press accounts of the Waldroup case, however, provided the public
with little more than a dramatized narrative of Waldroup's mitigating evi-
dence. Writing about Waldroup, articles ran with a range of unfortunate
headlines: "Can Your Genes Make You Murder?"' 6 or "Pity the Poor Mur-
derer, His Genes Made Him Do It."' 7 These depictions propelled the view
that behavioral genetics evidence can get a defendant "off the hook" entirely
for a crime; yet, the reality is that such evidence is mostly offered to miti-
gate punishment once a defendant's guilt has been established. The distinc-
tion is important. There are vast differences in the way evidence is used
between these two phases of a case.'8 The press also fostered a level of
cause-and-effect between genetics and behavior that Waldroup's attorneys
simply never argued, twisting the media's glint nearly exclusively on
Waldroup's genetics.
Not surprisingly, scientific advances and rising acceptance of genetics
research have fueled a focus on the use of behavioral genetics evidence in
criminal trials and death penalty cases. 9 At the same time, accurate ac-
11. Hagerty, supra note 7. For a discussion of MAOA and other genes of interest to
researchers studying psychopathy see Tracy D. Gunter et al., Behavioral Genetics in the
Antisocial Spectrum Disorders and Psychopathy: A Review of the Recent Literature, 28
BEHAV. Sci. L. 148 (2010).
12. Hagerty, supra note 7.
13. Id. After deliberating only eleven hours, the jury convicted Waldroup of aggra-
vated kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, voluntary manslaughter, and attempted
second-degree murder. Waldroup, 2011 WL 5051677, at * 1; Hagerty, supra note 7. The trial
court sentenced Waldroup "to an effective sentence of thirty-two years" and the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Tennessee affirmed. Waldroup, 2011 WL 5051677, at *1.
14. Hagerty, supra note 7.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. Nigel Barber, Pity the Poor Murderer, His Genes Made Him Do It, PSYCHOL.
TODAY, July 13, 2010, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-human-beast/201007/pity-
the-poor-murderer-his-genes-made-him-do-it.
18. See infra Subsection I.A.
19. See Deborah W. Denno, Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases:
1994-2007, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 317-54, 465-98
(Nita A. Farahany ed., 2009), available at http://ssm.com/author-13413 [hereinafter Behav-
ioral Genetics Evidence]; Kevin M. Beaver, Genetic Influences on Being Processed Through
970 Vol. 2011:967
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counts are lacking and questions remain on how courts view such evidence
and how attorneys select and apply it in litigation. This Article addresses
those questions.
The following pages provide a unique study of all criminal cases (to-
taling thirty-three) that addressed behavioral genetics evidence from June 1,
2007, to July 1, 2011.2' The Study builds upon this Author's prior research
on all criminal cases (totaling forty-eight) that used such evidence during
the preceding thirteen years (1994-2007).2' This combined collection of
eighty-one criminal cases employing behavioral genetics evidence offers a
rich context for determining how the criminal justice system has handled
genetics factors over nearly two decades, but also explains why the last four
years reveal particularly important trends.
In general, behavioral genetics researchers study both genetic and en-
vironmental sources of variation in human behavioral traits (for example,
mental illness and risk taking) in an effort to measure the inheritance of
particular characteristics.22 Therefore, the field of behavioral genetics is
broadly interdisciplinary, incorporating findings from genetics, biology,
psychology, sociology, and statistics, as well as other disciplines.23 While
genes influence behavior, they do not govern nor determine it.24 Rather,
"genes play a vital role in the body's development and physiology, and it is
through the body, acting in response to and upon surrounding environments,
the Criminal Justice System: Results from a Sample of Adoptees, 69 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHIATRY 282, 282-87 (2011); Patricia Cohen, Genetic Basis for Crime: A New Look,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2011, at CI.
20. See infra App. (listing and describing each of the thirty-three cases).
21. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 465-98.
22. See generally ROBERT PLOMIN ET AL., BEHAVIORAL GENETICS 305-33 (5th ed.
2008); Michael Rutter, Gene-Environmental Interplay: Scientific Issues and Challenges, in
GENE-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTIONS IN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 3, 3-17 (Ken-
neth A. Dodge & Michael Rutter eds., 2011); Kevin M. Beaver, Environmental Moderators
of Genetic Influences on Adolescent Delinquent Involvement and Victimization, 26 J.
ADOLESCENT RES. 84 (2011); Serena Bezdjian et al., Psychopathic Personality in Children:
Genetic and Environmental Contributions, 41 PSYCHOL. MED. 589 (2011); Avshalom Caspi
et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297 SCIENCE 851
(2002); Ian W. Craig, The Importance of Stress and Genetic Variation in Human Aggression,
29 BioESSAYS 227 (2007); Terrie Moffitt, The New Look of Genetics in Developmental Psy-
chopathology: Gene-Environment Interplay in Antisocial Behaviors, 131 PSYCHOL. BULL.
533 (2005); Joseph Mclnemey, What Is Behavioral Genetics?, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT
INFORMATION (last modified Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human
Genome/elsi/behavior.shtml).
23. For a broad overview of these kinds of interdisciplinary relationships see
GREGORY CAREY, HUMAN GENETICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2003); PLOMIN ET AL., supra
note 22; Tehrani & Mednick, supra note 5.
24. Matt McGue, The End of Behavioral Genetics?, 40 BEHAV. GENETICS 284, 288
(2010).
Michigan State Law Review
that behavior manifests itself."'2 5 Behavioral genetics evidence includes, but
is not limited to, the study of the defendant's family history as well as direct
testing of the defendant's physiological makeup by way of brain scans, for
example.26 Both approaches are informative for explaining why a defendant
engaged in criminally violent behavior. As one expert explained in the con-
text of the Loughner case, for example, "'Short of a brain scan that shows
mental defect, a family history of mental illness is the most persuasive evi-
dence that someone had significant mental problems at the time of the
crime. '"27
For decades, the concept of ties between genetics and crime has been
haunted with controversy.28 As late as 1992, for example, the National Insti-
tutes of Health gained worldwide press for defunding a conference on ge-
netics and crime due to claims that a genes-crime link stood for racism and
eugenics.29 As one behavioral scientist recently exclaimed, for the past three
or four decades "'most criminologists couldn't say the word "genetics"
without spitting.""'3 Yet presently, at least one hundred studies indicate a tie
between genetics and criminality, and criminologists are slowly being en-
couraged to examine the association further in light of other research on
behavioral problems (such as alcoholism and mental illness) that demon-
strate some kind of genetic foundation.3'
Most of these researchers are also quick to clarify their view on how
genes and criminality intertwine. They debunk, for example, a wrong-but
common-stereotype that an individual's "genotype" or "genetic constitu-
tion"3 2 is static, as though there is a "crime gene" that "hardwires" certain
people to violate the law.33 This perspective, however entrenched in the pub-
lic's mind, has no scientific support. Rather, an overwhelming amount of
25. CATHERINE BAKER, BEHAVIORAL GENETICS viii (2004), available at
http://www.aaas.org/spp/bgenes/Intro.pdf (report prepared for a project conducted by the
American Association for the Advancement of Science and The Hastings Center).
26. See infra Subsection IIB.
27. Lacey, supra note 2 (quoting Professor Christopher Slobogin).
28. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 317-24; see also Deborah
W. Denno, Revisiting the Legal Link Between Genetics and Crime, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 209 (2006) [hereinafter Revisiting the Legal Link]; Deborah W. Denno, The Legal
Implications of Genetics and Crime Research, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL
BEHAVIOUR 248 (Gregory Bock & Jamie Goode eds., 1996) (Ciba Foundation Symposium
194), available at http://ssm.com/author=13413 [hereinafter Legal Implications]. For an
intriguing discussion of eugenics in the context of debates about capital punishment see
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of Discontinuous
Debate, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2010).
29. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
30. Cohen, supra note 19.
31. Id.
32. CAREY, supra note 23, at 68.
33. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 323-24.
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evidence shows that genes are controlled by the environment and can either
enhance or heighten the likelihood of a certain behavior, such as criminality,
based on the surrounding circumstances.34 Thus, an individual's genetic
structure may act developmentally in the context of social variables by po-
tentially predisposing an individual to behavioral tendencies, such as ag-
gression, which may or may not result in law-breaking.35 For example,
many people may share a genetic proclivity for aggression, but some may
never act out their impulses in any physical way while others may become
violent career criminals. 6 This tight association between genetics and envi-
ronment explains why Loughner's attorneys would also look carefully at his
immediate family, home, school, and peer relationships in addition to any
genetic factors (such as mental illness) in order to better assess why he en-
gaged in such violence.37
Part I of this Article introduces the use of behavioral genetics evidence
in criminal cases by comparing two earlier cases involving two substantially
different defendants-Stephen Mobley (whose evidence was rejected) and
Susan Smith (whose evidence was accepted). For example, much of the
controversy surrounding Mobley's case stemmed from the assumption that
attorneys would abuse behavioral genetics evidence to support their posi-
tions and that courts would countenance the distortions.3" This Article con-
cludes that such predictions are, with rare exceptions, unfounded.
Part II discusses the thirty-three behavioral genetics and crime cases
that this Author studied between June 1, 2007, and July 1, 2011.39 These
cases share two important characteristics. First, they all constitute murder
convictions in which (with one exception) defendants attempted to use be-
havioral genetics evidence as a mitigating factor in a death penalty case (as
Stephen Mobley and Susan Smith did). Second, the behavioral genetics
evidence is introduced mostly to verify a condition (such as a type of mental
illness) that is commonly acceptable for mitigation." Thus, the question
now is not whether courts will accept behavioral genetics factors (they
overwhelmingly do), but rather what role those factors will play in particu-
34. CAREY, supra note 23, at 452.
35. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 323-24; see also Terrie E.
Moffitt, Genetic and Environmental Influences on Antisocial Behaviors: Evidence from
Behavioral-Genetic Research, in 55 ADVANCES IN GENETICS 41, 41-104 (Jeffrey C. Hall ed.,
2005) (analyzing the interaction between genes and the environment with respect to antiso-
cial behavior).
36. For an excellent example of how criminologists focus on the myriad criminal
pathways that offenders follow over their lifetimes see JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON,
SHARED BEGINNINGS, DIVERGENT LIVES: DELINQUENT Boys TO AGE 70 (2003).
37. Moisse, supra note 4.
38. Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 461 (Ga. 1998); see also infra notes 82-110
and accompanying text (discussing the Mobley case).
39. See infra Part II.
40. See infra Part II.
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lar cases in the context of mitigation evidence. According to this Author's
Study, for example, there was no case in which behavioral genetics factors
were introduced by the State, much less used as aggravating evidence or
indications that a defendant would be a future danger to others. Compared
to prior cases, attorneys are more likely to submit such evidence to demon-
strate a defendant's inheritance of substance or alcohol abuse. These results
challenge arguments that such evidence will be legally detrimental to a
defendant. Indeed, this Study's results indicate that, at the very least,
behavioral genetics evidence has no decipherable impact on a defendant's
case or, at most, it becomes an effective tool along with a range of other
kinds of variables in rendering a defendant ineligible for the death penalty.
Courts also appear willing to accept behavioral genetics evidence as part of
a defendant's mitigation story, even if genetics renders that story a more
troubling one in terms of the defendant's purported propensities.
Part III compares this Study of thirty-three cases to the Author's prior
study of forty-eight cases in order to examine whether courts have changed
their use of behavioral genetics evidence in the last four years relative to the
preceding thirteen years.4' Overall, courts today appear far less skeptical
about accepting behavioral genetics evidence, and they do so in the majority
of cases in which defense attorneys attempt to offer it. In contrast to past
years when courts often questioned the applicability or relevance of such
information, recent findings indicate that their focus has turned to whether
the evidence, when used with other factors in mitigation, can outweigh the
aggravating factors that support a death sentence.
It remains to be seen whether or how such trends will be affected by
Cullen v. Pinholster,4" the United States Supreme Court's recent decision
restricting prisoners' efforts to seek federal habeas relief under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 3 Two of
the cases in this Article's Study have already been impacted by Pinholster."
Regardless, behavioral genetics evidence seems, on the surface, to have
reached a status commensurate with other kinds of evidence without the
baggage of abuse with which it has typically been associated.
This Article has a number of caveats, of course, particularly given the
subject matter. Because nearly all of the eighty-one cases in this Author's
studies involve death sentences, comparisons across time can be a chal-
lenge. Litigation and appeals can go on for many years, and outcomes may
41. See infra Part 111.
42. 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
43. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S. Code).
44. See infra notes 463-64 and accompanying text.
Vol. 2011:967
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be continually shifting,45 hence the potential effect of Pinholster. Any as-
sessment of trends, therefore, must be taken in context because it may re-
flect in part outcomes in cases originating in different years or even dec-
ades. Nonetheless, clear changes within this Article's sample are evident,
and the focus is on those that are real rather than potentially random.
This Article acknowledges another concern. Cases involving behav-
ioral genetics evidence incorporate many other variables about the defend-
ant-biological, sociological, and environmental-in addition to the nature
of the crime and the defendant's criminal history. The jury's weighing of
these aggravating and mitigating factors in a death penalty case is an intri-
cate process. Therefore, this Study's results do not purport to suggest that
the inclusion of behavioral genetics evidence was the sole cause of any par-
ticular case outcome; this kind of causal mechanism is as impossible to iso-
late or measure for behavioral genetics evidence as it would be for any other
kind of variable. That said, this Study's case comparisons can help steer
conclusions in one direction or another about whether behavioral genetics
evidence can make a contribution, irrespective of other potential influences.
Overall, most courts seem to focus on screened and scientifically ac-
ceptable studies or information on behavioral genetics. Their primary em-
phasis also concerns how a defendant's genetic makeup and environment
might bear on that defendant's punishment. Within the next decade or so, as
this interactive gene-environment research becomes even more scientifically
sound, courts will find it ever more useful.46 After all, as the following pag-
es demonstrate, a gene is not just a gene. It is only one part of a defendant's
story.
I. How DOES THE GENE-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTION WORK?
Behavioral geneticists generally classify the link between genetics and
the environment in three primary ways.47 "Passive gene-environment corre-
lation" occurs when parents, the source of their children's genes, are also
one key source for the content of their children's environment.4" For exam-
ple, parents of superior intellect may transmit to their children not only
strong cognitive capabilities, but also mentally stimulating surroundings.
"Evocative gene-environment correlation" exists when individuals with
different genotypes evoke different responses from people and therefore
45. For example, this Article's Study of thirty-three cases included three cases from
the Author's prior study of forty-eight cases because the three cases were involved in ongo-
ing litigation that affected the acceptance of behavioral genetics evidence. See infra App.
46. See Bernet E-mail, supra note 8 ("1 would predict that in 10-15 years, behavioral
genomics will be on much more solid ground and will be of great practical value in both civil
and criminal trials.").
47. McGue, supra note 24, at 288.
48. Id.
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change their environment.49 Thus, a cooperative child may elicit substantial-
ly different reactions from parents and teachers than an aggressive child in
part because of the differences in how the two children behave. "[A]ctive
gene-environment correlation" arises when individuals seek experiences
consistent with their genetically transmitted abilities and behaviors so that
they can create a complementary environment." Thrill-seekers, for example,
may select jobs or hobbies that reinforce their inherited proclivities, such as
parachuting, mountain climbing, etc."
Substantial research also shows that as individuals develop from
childhood to adulthood, genetic influences on their behavior strengthen
while shared environmental factors wane.52 This pronounced impact of ge-
netic makeup is unsurprising given that individuals acquire greater control
over their choices and surroundings as they become more independent from
their parents and families. 3 In essence, then, aging is accompanied by in-
creases in active gene-environmental correlational processes and decreases
in passive gene-environmental correlational processes.54
In criminal cases, evidence concerning behavioral genetics covers all
three types of gene-environment classifications. It includes, for example, the
study of a defendant's physiological makeup as well as family history for
potential associations with a range of disorders including violence, mental
illness, depression, mental retardation, alcoholism, and substance abuse.
The presence of such disorders in a defendant's family can indicate that
they were genetically transmitted to the defendant.
A. Balancing Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
In a capital case, behavioral genetics evidence can be used in one of
two ways: first, during the guilt-or-innocence phase in which the State must
prove a defendant committed an alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt;
and/or second, during the penalty phase when the jury has found the de-
fendant guilty of the capital crime and then hears evidence of aggravation
from the State and mitigation from the defense when determining whether a





53. See Sandra Scarr & Kathleen McCarney, How People Make Their Own Envi-
ronments: A Theory of Genotype>Environmental Effects, 54 CHILD DEV. 424, 424-34
(1983).
54. McGue, supra note 24, at 288.
55. John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Life, Death, and Neuroimaging: The Ad-
vantages and Disadvantages of the Defense's Use of Neuroimages in Capital Cas-
es-Lessons from the Front, 62 MERCER L. REV. 909, 914 (2011).
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tween the ways evidence is used in these two phases. The guilt-or-
innocence phase involves a factual determination of whether a defendant
committed the crime. In contrast, the penalty phase concerns "the moral and
normative choice" of whether a defendant "'deserve[s] to die."' 56 In order to
ensure consistency in comparing cases, this Article focuses on the use of
behavioral genetics evidence during the penalty phase irrespective of
whether some cases also raised such evidence during the guilt-or-innocence
phase. The penalty phase of a capital case is typically far better documented
than the guilt-or-innocence phase, which may have occurred years before
and may not have been fully explicated either in a court case or some other
accessible format.
5 7
It is within this death penalty context that most of the cases analyzed
in the Author's Study also raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 8
In order to assess the validity of these kinds of challenges, the Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington59 established a two-pronged test: first,
counsel's performance must actually be "deficient," and second, this defi-
cient performance must have "prejudiced" the defendant.6" Of course this
Strickland test and its interpretations are far more intricate than what is pre-
sented here for the purpose of establishing basic guidelines.
In addition to rules attempting to ensure the quality of a defendant's
representation, the great majority of death penalty states require that a fact-
finder consider and weigh both aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
the case. This balancing is important. In most jurisdictions, aggravating
circumstances must outweigh mitigating circumstances for a defendant to be
sentenced to death.6' However, the Supreme Court has also upheld a Kansas
death penalty statute that allowed jurors to impose the death penalty when
aggravating circumstances were not required to outweigh mitigating cir-
cumstances, including when aggravating and mitigating circumstances were
equally distributed.62 Regardless, if a defendant challenges a death sentence,
56. Id. at 915 (citation omitted).
57. This Author did attempt to trace back over numerous, at times unpublished or
unavailable, proceedings and trials to determine when and how behavioral genetics evidence
was first used in the thirty-three cases under study. However, legal databases simply do not
begin to make accessible every record at issue in a case. Given the hit-or-miss and at times
speculative nature of the venture, it appeared that any picture pieced together could be unre-
liable or misleading.
58. See infra Chart 2; note 190 and accompanying text.
59. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
60. Id. at 687.
61. For discussions of these factors and how they interplay see James R. Acker &
Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Life or Death: The Sentencing Provisions in Capital Punish-
ment Statutes, 31 CRiM. L. BULL. 19, 33-52 (1995); 0. Carter Snead, Memory and Punish-
ment, 64 VAND. L. REv. 1195, 1248-52 (2011).
62. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173, 181 (2006).
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a reviewing court must reweigh the aggravating evidence against the totality
of available mitigating evidence.63
Under Strickland, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has merit
only if "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the ad-
versarial process that the trial [including the sentencing phase] cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result."' To succeed on such a claim,
the defendant must show that his trial counsel's conduct was unreasonable
under the circumstances and resulted in prejudice against him.65 The sen-
tence will be disturbed only if a reviewing court finds a "reasonable proba-
bility" that, absent counsel's errors, the verdict or sentence would have been
different.66 A court must therefore determine whether there is a reasonable
probability that if trial counsel had presented the omitted mitigating evi-
dence, the fact-finder would have concluded that the balance of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances did not warrant the death penalty.67
Mitigating evidence usually includes information about a capital de-
fendant's background and life prior to his crime.68 In contrast, the prosecu-
tion's presentation of aggravating evidence includes those circumstances
surrounding a crime and a defendant's prior criminal record.69 Death penalty
jurisdictions vary with respect to the types of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances they enable a fact-finder to consider. Common statutory ag-
gravating factors include the following: commission of an offense in an
"[e]specially heinous, cruel or depraved manner," "[u]se, threatened use or
possession of a deadly weapon," or commission of an offense expecting to
receive something of "pecuniary value."7 Statutory mitigating factors can
include the "age of the defendant" or the "defendant's capacity to appreciate
the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct."'" According to the Supreme
Court, defendants can also present mitigating evidence relevant to "'any
aspect of [the] defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death."' This is a highly open-ended standard that allows a defendant to
63. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003).
64. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
65. Id. at 694.
66. Id.
67. Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 229 (Okla. 2007).
68. Id. at 223. For a recent perspective on the use of mitigation evidence see Jeffrey
Toobin, The Mitigator: A New Way of Looking at the Death Penalty, NEW YORKER, May 9,
2011, at 32.
69. Malone, 168 P.3d at 229.
70. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-701(D) (2011) (listing Arizona's aggravating factors).
71. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-701(E) (2011) (listing Arizona's mitigating factors).
72. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 174 (2006) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978)); see also id. at 172-74 (designating that all death penalty sentencing
schemes must "(1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants; and (2) permit a
Vol. 2011:967
Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases
introduce a full range of factors. Guidelines for how to weigh or balance
these factors are similarly flexible. In an effort to structure what could be a
substantial amount of information-including many different types of scien-
tific tests and theories-attorneys often attempt to combine it all into a
compelling "story."73
B. Mitigation Stories
A defendant's "mitigation story"74 can be critical to determining
whether a defendant will be executed. Mitigating factors are far-reaching
and subjective; they can prompt jurors to feel empathy and connection with
a defendant who jurors have just convicted of committing horrendous acts.75
The evidence can also profile and detail a defendant's damaged and disa-
bled brain so that jurors can comprehend how distorted a defendant's
thought processes may have been throughout that defendant's life, including
the seconds immediately preceding the defendant's crime.7 6 Statutory and
non-statutory mitigating factors can likewise pertain to circumstances at the
scene of the crime, for example, if "the defendant was under unusual or
substantial duress."77 The purpose of expert testimony, if it is offered, can
further assist jurors in experiencing the defendant's particular worldview."
In essence, mitigation-as well as the Court's "any aspect of the defend-
ant's character or record"79 standard-can present the defendant's biography
in a way that can attempt to tip the scale toward life rather than death.8"
Such guidelines are also remarkably flexible. The trial judge in Jeffrey
Landrigan's sentencing hearing, for example, concluded that one of the two
non-statutory mitigating circumstances operating on Landrigan's behalf was
"that Landrigan's family loved him,""1 evidence that would be irrelevant for
Landrigan as a defense against a murder conviction.
jury to render a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible
defendant's record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime").
73. For an example of how such a story can be told in the death penalty context see
Deborah W. Denno, Who is Andrea Yates? A Short Story About Insanity, 10 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL'v 1 (2003).
74. Blume & Paavola, supra note 55, at 914.
75. Id. at 915.
76. Id. at 915-16.
77. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-701(E) (2011) (listing Arizona's mitigating factors).
78. Blume & Paavola, supra note 55, at 915.
79. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 174 (2006) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978)).
80. Blume & Paavola, supra note 55, at 916. For a thorough discussion of the mean-
ing of mitigation see Russell Stetler, The Mystery of Mitigation: What Jurors Need to Make a
Reasoned Moral Response in Capital Sentencing, 11 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 237(2008).
81. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 470 (2007).
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Such elasticity enables defendants to submit as mitigation behavioral
genetics evidence that goes back generations. Regardless, over the years,
some courts have viewed behavioral genetics factors skeptically, even when
deciding capital cases. One example of this attitude is the 1994 appeal of
Stephen Mobley, a watershed moment in the modem use of behavioral ge-
netics evidence and a comparison case for this Article's Study. Indeed,
Mobley marks the start of this Author's seventeen-year analysis of the ap-
plication of such evidence in criminal cases; the case's facts and defense
strategy seemed to strike a modem nerve, both socially and legally.
Mobley's mitigation story is also complex.
1. The Stephen Mobley Story
Mobley's 1991 crime-the attempted robbery of a Domino's Pizza
store that ended with the needless murder of the store's manager" 2-
prompted particular challenges for his court-appointed attorneys." Mobley's
"numerous" confessions and the dearth of 'traditional mitigation evi-
dence' did not make for a sympathetic story.84 As a white adult of twenty-
five years, Mobley was economically privileged,85 had no history of physi-
cal or sexual abuse,86 and also demonstrated an early and continuous history
of severe personal and behavioral disorders that were pronounced even
when he was awaiting trial.8 7 Prospects for any defense appeared slight. Yet,
in the course of analyzing Mobley's family, a relative testified that four
generations of Mobleys-including Mobley's uncles, aunts, and a grandfa-
ther-engaged in acts of violence, aggression, and behavioral disorder.88
82. Mobley v. State, 426 S.E.2d 150, 151 (Ga. 1993); Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d
61, 65 (Ga. 1995); Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 461 (Ga. 1998); Behavioral Genetics
Evidence, supra note 19, at 325.
83. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463; Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 325-
26.
84. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463-64 (citations omitted); Daniel A. Summer, The Use of
Human Genome Research in Criminal Defense and Mitigation of Punishment, in GENETICS
AND CRIMINALITY: THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION IN COURT 182, 189
(Jeffrey R. Botkin et al. eds., 1999); see also Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463-66 (recognizing the
lack of available mitigating evidence in Mobley's background).
85. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463-64.
86. Id. at 463.
87. These behaviors ranged from lying and theft as a youth to more serious offenses
in adolescence, resulting in prison sentences for forgery and culminating in numerous armed
robberies during Mobley's mid-twenties and up to the point of the Domino's Pizza murder.
Summer, supra note 84, at 189. While awaiting trial for that murder, Mobley's aggression
was out of control: he fought continually with other inmates, sodomized his cellmate, tat-
tooed the word "Domino" on his own back, and verbally taunted and threatened prison
guards. Id; see also Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 463-64; Legal Implications, supra note 28, at 251-
52.
88. Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 465.
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Such behavior ranged from serious crimes (murder and rape) to extreme
spousal abuse, alcoholism, explosive temperaments, and antisocial con-
duct."
In order to further probe this lead, Mobley's attorneys made two
moves. First, they requested experts and financial support so that scientific
tests could be conducted to determine if Mobley showed any kind of genetic
or neurochemical imbalance.9" Second, they introduced into evidence a
then-recent article published in the prestigious journal Science,9 reporting
the results of genetic testing of a Dutch kindred of four generations." The
kindred comprised a number of males affected by a syndrome characterized
by borderline mental retardation and serious behavioral dysfunction such as
impulsivity, verbal and physical aggression, and violence.93 The acts of vio-
lence included rape, sexual abuse, attempted murder, and arson.94 Tests on
these males showed evidence of MAOA deficiency, which was passed from
mother to son and linked to regulating aggression.95
Mobley's attorneys wanted to investigate whether Mobley was also af-
flicted by the MAOA deficiency or by a comparable kind of disability be-
cause it was likely that Mobley had inherited a propensity for criminality. In
their mind, the trial court should have enabled Mobley to be so tested." Cer-
tainly such testing was allowed in the Bradley Waldroup case that would
arise over a decade later.97 Yet, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected that
reasoning and affirmed the trial court's holding, relying on the lack of a
89. Id.; Legal Implications, supra note 28, at 251 & fig. 1.
90. Legal Implications, supra note 28, at 252; Summer, supra note 84, at 189.
91. H.G. Brunner et at., Abnormal Behavior Associated with a Point Mutation in the
Structural Genefor Monoamine Oxidase A, 262 SCIENCE 578 (1993) [hereinafter Brunner et
al., Abnormal Behavior]; see also Paul S. Appelbaum, Behavioral Genetics and the
Punishment of Crime, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 25, 25 (2005) (discussing the Brunner et al.
study). For a general overview of the research see Han G. Brunner, MAOA Deficiency and
Abnormal Behaviour: Perspectives on an Association, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND
ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 155, 155-67 (Gregory Bock & Jamie Goode eds., 1996) (Ciba
Foundation Symposium 194) [hereinafter Brunner, MAOA Deficiency]. For details on the
studies see Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior, supra; H.G. Brunner et al., X-Linked Border-
line Mental Retardation with Prominent Behavioral Disturbance: Phenotype, Genetic Local-
ization, and Evidence for Disturbed Monoamine Metabolism, 52 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1032
(1993) [herinafter Brunner et al., X-Linked].
92. Brunner, MAOA Deficiency, supra note 91, at 156.
93. Id.
94. Brunner et al., X-Linked, supra note 91, at 1035.
95. Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior, supra note 91, at 578-79.
96. See Legal Implications, supra note 28, at 251-52 (discussing the Mobley case in
light of historical and contemporary arguments concerning the use of genetics evidence in
criminal law cases); see also Revisiting the Legal Link, supra note 28, at 212; Behavioral
Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 325-30.
97. See supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text.
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showing of any causal link between Mobley's genetics and his violence.98
As the court explained, the genetics theory involved in Mobley's case "will
not have reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty in the near future
and... Mobley could not show that such a stage will ever be reached."9'
After further legal wrangling over such "an unorthodox mitigating de-
fense that attempted to show a possible genetic basis for Mobley's con-
duct,"' the Georgia Supreme Court again denied genetic testing for
Mobley, but for a somewhat different reason than it had expressed three
years earlier.' In the court's view, Mobley had in fact been "able to present
the genetics theory" through a relative's testimony about the family's gen-
erations of behavioral problems.0 2 Further, even if the court had allowed
genetic testing, "there ha[d] been no showing that a geneticist would have
offered additional significant evidence."'0 3 Ultimately, however, family his-
tory evidence alone failed to mitigate in Mobley's case."° In 2005, after
additional appeals, he was executed. 5
Mobley's request for genetic testing-in addition to other events at the
time-invited pervasive national and international debate on the political
and scientific acceptability of behavioral genetics evidence of criminality.' 6
The debate invoked earlier controversies: the historical association of genet-
ics evidence with the Holocaust, the chilling of free will, the stigmatization
of disordered populations, the absolution from social responsibility, and the
fear that juries would be unduly swayed by the seemingly more objective
and precise nature of genetic studies.'0 7 These concerns also played into the
1992 conference at the University of Maryland regarding the potential racial
bias of such evidence. 0 8
98. Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 66 (Ga. 1995).
99. Id.
100. Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 463 (Ga. 1998).
101. Id. at463-66.
102. Id. at 466.
103. Id.
104. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 325-30.
105. Mark Davis, Final Appeals Fail; Killer Mobley Dies, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar.
2, 2005, at B3; Mark Davis, Mobley Dies for 1991 Murder; Supreme Court Denies Last
Appeals Half-Hour Before Execution, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 2, 2005, at IJJ.
106. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 317-20, 325-30; Legal
Implications, supra note 28, at 251-53 (citing articles discussing the controversy surrounding
the Mobley case).
107. Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 254.
108. The University of Maryland planned to hold a conference on The Meaning and
Significance of Research on Genetics and Criminal Behavior. David Wasserman, a legal
scholar and organizer of the conference, noted at the time, "There are a hell of a lot of people
attending this conference who think the dangers of genetic research are as great in the long
term as the dangers of atomic energy." Mike Pezzella, Violence DNA Researchers Mum on
Meeting, Hoping to Avoid Protests, BIOTECH. NEWSWATCH, Apr. 15, 1996, at 14; Wade
Roush, Conflict Marks Crime Conference, 269 SCIENCE 1808, 1808 (1995) ("The [Maryland]
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After Mobley, predictions were also made that attorneys would in-
creasingly attempt to introduce behavioral genetics evidence in criminal
cases during the guilt-or-innocence phase or as mitigation during the penal-
ty phase."° While such predictions are difficult to measure, this Author's
study of cases from 1994-2007 suggested that the strategy grew in use, es-
pecially for the defense. Not only were behavioral genetics studies becom-
ing more sophisticated, but so were defense attorneys, especially in their
willingness to rely on interdisciplinary research."0 Likewise, the particularly
strong reaction against Mobley's case seems, in retrospect, an outlier be-
cause other cases at the time were also introducing behavioral genetics evi-
dence. The highly publicized case of Susan Smith, for example, appeared to
use such evidence far more successfully.
2. The Susan Smith Story
Susan Smith's 1995 trial in South Carolina took place one year after
Mobley's controversial appeal."' Smith was convicted of murdering her two
young sons by causing her car to roll into a lake with her sons strapped in-
side. She ultimately avoided a death sentence seemingly in part because her
conference ... has been protested, canceled, rescheduled, and otherwise dogged by contro-
versy ever since it was first planned ...."). Previously, the conference had been cancelled
because of the controversial nature of the topic. Carolyn Abraham, DNA at 50: The First of a
3 Part Series, The Bad Seed, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Mar. 1, 2003, at FI ("In 1992, just a
year before Mr. Summer seized on the Dutch family study, the U.S. National Institutes of
Health cancelled a conference on crime and genetics at the University of Maryland-after
black groups protested that such research was racially motivated."); Clive Cookson, Contro-
versial Search for the Criminal Gene: A Conference the Americans Would not Allow, FIN.
TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 14, 1995, at 8 ("Public pressure forced the US National Institutes of
Health to cancel a conference on [genetics and behavior] in 1992 after opponents of the
research detected racial overtones in some of the proposed contributions."); Pezzella, supra
("Even participants [of the Maryland conference] found the meeting somewhat distasteful.
Paul R. Billings, a professor at Stanford University ... said he feared the current concentra-
tion on genetics could bring back the kind of eugenics movement that was espoused by the
Nazis."); Richard W. Stevenson, Researchers See Gene Link To Violence But Are Wary,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at 29 ("[The Maryland] conference was called off after critics
said that it was too accepting of the idea that inherited personality traits were the primary
causes of crime and violence and that it would promote the notion that criminals could be
identified by genetic markers."); Tom Wilkie, Scientist Denounces Criminal Gene Theory,
INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 13, 1995, at 2 ("'[The Maryland conference] was seen as overt-
ly racist."').
109. Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 321.
110. See infra Subsection III.C.
111. See Transcript of Examination of Dr. Sandra Confradi at * 1, SLED Agent L.A.
"Pete" Logan, Wanda Palmer, Gail Hollis, Ernest Talley, FBI Special Agent Carol Allison,
and Dr. Arlene Andrews, State v. Smith, 1995 WL 551104 (S.C. Gen. Sess. July 20, 1995)
(Nos. 94-GS-44-906 & 94-GS-44-907) [hereinafter Transcript, Examination of Dr. Sandra
Confradi].
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defense team introduced mitigating evidence that she had suffered from
depression since childhood." 2 According to Smith's defense, she was on the
verge of committing suicide and taking her two children with her when she
changed her mind at the last minute and leaped from the car, all the while
watching while the car submerged." 3 Testimony indicated that Smith's state
of mind was so distressed at the time that she was not able to think about
her drowning children.'
In an effort to support its case, the defense presented expert witness
testimony of Smith's family history and upbringing."5 According to defense
witness and psychiatrist Seymour Halleck, M.D., there was a high incidence
of depression and mental illness in Susan Smith's family."6 Her older
brother Michael, her grandmother, and her aunt had all attempted suicide;
this pattern indicated that it was likely that Smith herself was genetically
predisposed to depression (such high levels of mental illness in the family
"increases [a person's] chances threefold" for depression).' Defense wit-
ness and social worker Dr. Arlene Andrews created a "genogram," shown in
Figure 1,' which illustrated the family's history of behavioral disorder'
112. See generally Transcript of Closing Arguments, Jury Instructions, Verdict of the
Jury, Sentencing, State v. Smith, 1995 WL 789245 (S.C. Gen. Sess. July 28, 1995) (Nos. 94-
GS-44-906 & 94-GS-44-907) [hereinafter Transcript, Closing Arguments]; see also GEORGE
REKERS, SUSAN SMITH: VICTIM OR MURDERER (1996) (providing an overview of Smith's
background, trial, verdict, and sentencing); Melinda E. O'Neil, The Gender Gap Argument:
Exploring the Disparity of Sentencing Women to Death, 25 NEw ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 213, 227-33 (1999) (examining the Susan Smith case in the context of gender
stereotyping on death row).
113. Transcript, Closing Arguments, supra note 112, at *22 (testimony of Seymour
Halleck, M.D.) ("And [defense witness] Dr. Halleck concluded after reviewing the whole
history, everything that I have just passed over quickly now, that she was in a depressive
crisis, in a depressive episode. And in the irrationality of that moment she made the irrational
choice of suicide.").
114. Id.at*23.
115. See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
117. Transcript of Examination of Phoebe Kay Dillard at *31-32, James William
Shaw, Jr., Seymour L. Halleck, Iris Rogers, Amy Gibson & Deborah Green, State v. Smith,
1995 WL 578226 (S.C. Gen. Sess. July 21, 1995) (Nos. 94-GS-44-906 & 94-GS-44-907). As
Dr. Halleck detailed:
Well, there is a very high incidence of mental illness in the blood members of her
family. We call this heavy genetic loading, which really means that there is a very,
very high chance that a person with this kind of frequency of illness in the family
would get depressed .... I think the bottom line in this is that we know that having
this kind of family tree increases your chances threefold that she will get de-
pressed.
Id.
118. See infra Figure 1. The original genogram presented in court is color-coded to
indicate particular disorders. See infra note 119. Because Figure 1 in this Article cannot be in
color, disorders are indicated by initials, as shown. See infra Figure 1.
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across three generations. The genogram contained details of each relative
who had experienced one or more of a number of serious conditions: de-
pression, a suicide attempt or suicide success (Smith's father), alcohol
abuse, mental retardation, or other disability. 2 ' In addition to the genetics
evidence, testimony revealed that Smith's early childhood upbringing was
characterized by family tension and instability due to her parents' separa-
tion, followed by her father's suicide when Smith was six years old.'2' Dr.
Andrews testified that these events led to the development of Smith's de-
pendent depressive disorder, in which she constantly needed love and atten-
tion from those around her and was frequently distraught over losing this
emotional support.'22
Drawing on this history, the defense brought up Smith's first suicide
attempt at age thirteen to demonstrate how Smith's upbringing had affected
her mental health.'23 During her later teenage years, Smith's stepfather sex-
ually abused her.'24 Dr. Andrews testified that this trauma further exacerbat-
ed Smith's depression, as she was afraid to lose her stepfather, but at the
same time felt that she was violating her own moral code. 25 Smith's second
suicide attempt came at the age of eighteen, Dr. Andrews testified, most
likely because Smith was afraid of losing the relationships with her forty-
119. The genogram was Defense Exhibit No. 4 prepared by defense witness Dr. Ar-
lene Andrews. A photo of the genogram was taken and sent to the author by William F.
Gault, Clerk of Court, Union County, South Carolina. See E-mail from William F. Gault,
Clerk of Court, Union County, South Carolina to author (Apr. 18, 2011, 18:26 EST) (on file
with author). According to CAMPBELL'S PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY, a genogran is a
[g]raphic representation of the history and the relationship structure of the family,
emphasizing the connection between events and patterns; the genealogy of a fami-
ly; family tree. In family therapy, the genogram is a means of identifying intergen-
erational continuities and the ways in which the past determined both the expressed
and the unexpressed expectation that family members have of one another.
CAMPBELL'S PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 419 (Robert J. Campbell ed., 8th ed. 2004).
120. Transcript, Examination of Dr. Sandra Confradi, supra note 111, at *68-70
(noting that Smith's father, mother, and three paternal aunts had suffered from depression,
and that her maternal grandmother and brother had attempted suicide).
121. Transcript of Examination of Steve Derrick at *36-39, Scotty Vaughan, and
Arlene Andrews, State v. Smith, 1995 WL 702707 (S.C. Gen. Sess. July 26, 1995) (Nos. 94-
GS-44-906 & 94-GS-44-907) [hereinafter Transcript, Examination of Steve Derrick].
122. Id. at *43. Dr. Andrews stated that part of becoming an independent adult was
learning to trust, including learning to trust that when one's parents leave, they will come
back. Since Smith's father committed suicide when she was very young, Smith never learned
to move on to the next stage and remained "stuck" in dependency. Id.
123. Id. at *45-46.
124. Id. at *47.
125. Id. at *52-53 (noting that Smith was very depressed during this time, feeling
worthless and ashamed, acquiring self-defeating behavior, becoming anxious and very de-
pendent, and prone to distorted thinking).
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year-old supervisor and thirty-year-old co-worker, both of whom she had
been involved with sexually. 26
Smith's marriage to David Smith, the father of their two children, was
rocky and characterized by repeated intervals of separation and reconcilia-
tion. 27 During one of these separation periods, Smith had intimate affairs
with Tom Findlay as well as Findlay's father, Cary, who owned Conso
Products, where Smith was employed.' 28 David Smith found a letter Smith
had written to Tom Findlay and pressed Smith into giving him the details of
the affair, including Smith's relationship with Cary Findlay.' 29 The prosecu-
tion argued that Smith killed her children because Tom Findlay did not want
to be burdened by someone who had a "readymade" family.'3° The defense,
on the other hand, argued that Smith was driven to commit suicide because
her husband's threat to disclose her affairs would have left her jobless, dis-
graced, and alone.'3'
These kinds of fears, in the past, had aggravated Smith's depressive
disorder and had prompted her suicidal attempts.3 2 The situation was no
different here. However, the defense argued, at the last minute, Smith, per-
haps in a moment of unconscious self-preservation, jumped out of the car
without thinking and did not realize that she had left her two children in the
car to die.'33 Since her depression prevented her from possessing the neces-
126. Id. at *54.
127. Id. at *56-60.
128. Id. at*59-61.
129. Id.
130. See REKERS, supra note 112, at 141 (referring to a "readymade" family). Tom
Findlay had written a letter to Susan explaining his feelings about the children as well as
other differences between the two of them. Transcript of Testimony at *7-8, South Carolina
v. Smith, 1995 WL 465719 (S.C. Gen. Sess. July 19, 1995) (Nos. 94-GS-44-906, 94-GS-44-
907) (relying on the testimony and letter of Tom Findlay). An excerpt of the letter concern-
ing the children is as follows:
Susan, I can really fall for you. You have so many endearing qualities about you,
and I think that you are a terrific person. But like I have told you before, there are
some things about you that aren't suited for me, and yes, I am speaking about your
children. I'm sure that your kids are good kids, but it really wouldn't matter how
good they may be. The fact is, I just don't want children. These feelings may
change one day, but I doubt it. With all of the crazy, mixed-up things that take
place in this world today, I just don't have the desire to bring another life into it.
And I don't want to be responsible for anyone else's children, either. But I am very
thankful that there are people like you who are not so selfish as I am, and you don't
mind bearing the responsibility of children. If everyone thought the way I do, our
species would eventually become extinct.
Id.
131. Transcript, Examination of Steve Derrick, supra note 121, at *60-61.
132. See id.
133. Transcript, Closing Arguments, supra note 112, at *22 ("And [defense witness]
Dr. Halleck concluded after reviewing the whole history, everything that I have just passed
over quickly now, that she was in a depressive crisis, in a depressive episode. And in the
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sary mental state for premeditated murder, the defense argued, Smith should
not be given a death sentence."3 Closing arguments reiterated this theme of
lifelong disorder. The strategy also explained why the defense "presented
the evidence about Susan Smith's entire life, going all the way back genera-
tions to show.., her bloodline and her genetic inheritance and her suscepti-
bility to pressure, and coming all the way forward."' 35
Media interviews with some of the members of Smith's jury indicated
that such biographical evidence appeared to be persuasive in their decision
to reject the death penalty.'36 Smith received a life term with the opportunity
to be paroled in 2024.37 According to some jurors, particular aspects of
Smith's life circumstances appeared to explain the reasons for her behav-
ior--the suicide of her biological father followed by molestation and sexual
abuse by her stepfather, as well as Smith's own suicide attempts at ages
thirteen and eighteen and her troubling sexual relationships while she was
an adult.'38 In the eyes of one juror, for example, such family tragedies were
"not dealt with properly, and that led up to what [Smith] did"'39 and "the
irrational decisions that she made.""'4 In the eyes of another juror, the ac-
tions of Smith's stepfather were partly responsible, and he "'should be
irrationality of that moment she made the irrational choice of suicide."); id. at *20-23 (rely-
ing on the testimony of defense witness Dr. Seymour Halleck).
134. Id.at"17.
135. Id.
136. See Mike Doming, Jurors Hope Susan Smith Gets Psychiatric Help, AUSTIN
AM., July 30, 1995, at A2 (interviews with Smith trial jurors Robbie Christian, Deborah
Benvenuti, Roy Palmer, and John Dunn); CBS This Morning, Interview with Smith Trial
Juror Michael Roberts (CBS television broadcast July 31, 1995) (transcript on file with
author) (interview by anchor Paula Zahn); CNN News, Smith Juror Discusses Susan Smith
Verdict (CNN television broadcast July 29, 1995) (Transcript # 1156-3 on file with author)
(interview with Smith trial juror Michael Roberts by anchor Jeanne Meserve); see also South
Carolina Mother Sentenced to Life in Sons' Drownings; Smith Avoids Death Penalty; Other
Developments, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Aug. 3, 1995, at Al (discussing some of
the key testimony in the case that influenced jurors).
137. During the guilt-or-innocence phase, the jury of nine men and three women
convicted Smith on two counts of murder after deliberating for less than three hours. See
Tom Morgenthau, Will They Kill Susan Smith?, NEWSWEEK, July 31, 1995, at 65. During the
penalty phase, the same jury again deliberated less than three hours and sentenced Smith to
life in prison. See Transcript, Closing Arguments, supra note 112, at *51 (quoting Albert
Epps, Jury Foreman). Information provided by the South Carolina Department of Corrections
indicates that Susan Smith will be eligible for parole on November 4, 2024, after serving a
minimum of thirty years. Presently, she is incarcerated at Leath Correctional Institution in
Greenwood County, South Carolina. See Incarcerated Inmate Search, SOUTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, https://sword.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/?id=00221487
&youth=N&type=F; http://www.webcitation.org/5s3Pjuosa.
138. Doming, supra note 136; CBS This Morning, supra note 136; CNN News, supra
note 136.
139. CBS This Morning, supra note 136.
140. CNN News, supra note 136.
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locked up with her."" 41 Yet another juror expressed concern over Smith's
mental illness and the hope that Smith would get the appropriate help for it
in prison.1
4 2
At the same time, Smith's jury still found her guilty of murder because
they were convinced that she had understood the difference between right
and wrong; she had also made a conscious decision to drown her sons, and
she could have decided otherwise.'43 Compared to the Stephen Mobley case,
however, there was no evidence in Smith's case of a strong legal or public
outcry against the use of behavioral genetics evidence. Nor do news stories
about the Smith case appear to associate her with a kind of behavioral ge-
netics defense.
C. "Exotic" Mitigation Stories
There is no mystery about why Susan Smith avoided a death sentence.
Reasons include Smith's lack of past violent conduct, her history of family
abuse, her depression and mental health challenges, her remorse, as well as
her attorneys' efforts to offer uncontroversial genetics evidence. However,
this Article's message is not based on an attempt to substantively compare
Smith's case with that of Stephen Mobley. Instead, what Smith's case
shows is the importance of behavioral genetics evidence to telling a defend-
ant's story, whether or not that evidence successfully outweighs the aggra-
vating factors in that story or is even particularly compelling. In Smith's
case the evidence appeared persuasive, perhaps in part because behavioral
genetics factors also reveal as much about environmental influences on a
defendant as they do about a defendant's heritable traits.
Indeed, modem research continues to emphasize the importance of
environmental effects on behavior,'" thereby dashing the common myth
that an individual's genetic structure is unchanging."' During the past dec-
ade in particular, criminological investigations have increasingly incorpo-
rated genetic, biological, and social measures as vehicles for understanding
crime. When these studies employ many different kinds of variables, their
results show that genetics and biology continually accentuate the signifi-
cance of social factors on behavior-so much so that the three interactive
categories ("genetic," "biological," and "social") are often difficult to sepa-
rate and decipher.'" Recent federally-funded meetings on genetics and
141. Doming, supra note 136.
142. Id.
143. CBS This Morning, supra note 136.
144. See supra notes 22-37, 47-54 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
146. For examinations of the relationships among these variables see CAREY, supra
note 23; Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 405, 487 (2005); Moffitt, supra note 35; Tehrani & Mednick, supra note 5.
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crime emphasize this very interactive aspect, and the meetings have ceased
to draw the negative publicity that they have in the past.'47
Irrespective of how researchers are handling this evidence, different
courts can still have varying perspectives. The Mobley court, for example,
viewed the theory of a link between behavioral genetics and violence as
"unorthodox."' 48 In 2001, a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel in
Landrigan v. Stewart'49 still considered such evidence "exotic" and ineffec-
tual as mitigation. 5° As recently as 2007, in Schriro v. Landrigan,5' the
United States Supreme Court validated the Ninth Circuit panel's assessment
by directly quoting part of the panel's conclusions.5 2
At the same time, a fuller account of the Landrigan case shows twists
and turns in how the evidence was treated because the Ninth Circuit was, at
one point, more accepting of it. Jeffrey Landrigan was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death in 1993,' one year before Stephen Mobley.'54 After
the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Landrigan's conviction and sentence'55
and the district court rejected Landrigan's petition for habeas corpus relief,
Landrigan appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.'56 Landrigan's
numerous post conviction appeals and petitions were based in part on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his counsel did not
investigate and introduce a sufficient amount of acceptable mitigating evi-
dence.5 7 The three-judge appellate panel denied Landrigan's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim and affirmed the district court's decision.'58 Cit-
ing Mobley v. Head59 and Turpin v. Mobley, 6° the panel emphasized that
the "rather exotic ...genetic violence theory" pinpointing the impact of
Landrigan's "biological background" would not have affected the outcome
of Landrigan's trial, even if the theory had been introduced. 6' As the panel
147. Cohen, supra note 19.
148. Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 463 (Ga. 1998).
149. 272 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2001).
150. Id. at 1228.
151. 550 U.S. 465 (2007).
152. Id. at481.
153. State v. Landrigan, 859 P.2d 111, 114 (Ariz. 1993).
154. See Turpin, 502 S.E.2d at 460.
155. Landrigan, 859 P.2d at 118.
156. Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001).
157. Id. at 1224.
158. Id. at 1229.
159. 267 F.3d 1312 (11 th Cir. 2001).
160. 502 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. 1998).
161. Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1228 n.4. Landrigan refuted the panel's reliance on the
Mobley cases in a subsequent supplemental brief. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner-Appellant
at 2, Landrigan v. Stewart, 397 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 00-99011). Citing a wide
range of research for support, the brief emphasized that Landrigan's genetic predisposition
does not render violent behavior a certainty but simply indicates a higher risk for antisocial
tendencies. Id. at 1-6.
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explained, "although Landrigan's new evidence can be called mitigating in
some slight sense, it would also have shown the court that it could anticipate
that he would continue to be violent."' 62 Given Landrigan's reluctance to
express remorse or provide the reasons for his crimes, his behavioral genet-
ics would not have been persuasive. 63
After further petitions," in 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ordered that Landrigan's case be reheard en banc.165 On rehearing, the Court
of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. 6 6 In so
doing, the Ninth Circuit's opinion indicated a considerable amount of open-
ness and receptivity concerning Landrigan's efforts to introduce mitigating
genetic and family history evidence. 67
Such receptivity was short-lived, however. In 2007, on grant of certio-
rari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, forcefully supporting a
number of the concerns about Landrigan's dangerousness that were articu-
lated by the Ninth Circuit's initial decision. 68 Addressing Landrigan's al-
leged genetic predisposition to violence, for example, the Court found it
"difficult to improve upon the initial Court of Appeals panel's conclusion"
that Landrigan "'not only failed to show remorse or offer mitigating evi-
dence, but he flaunted his menacing behavior"'; therefore, "'assuring the
court that genetics made him the way he is could not have been very help-
ful.""'1 69 Describing Landrigan's mitigation evidence as "weak," and noting
that "the postconviction court was well acquainted with Landrigan's ex-
ceedingly violent past and had seen first hand his belligerent behavior," the
162. Landrigan, 272 F.3d at 1229.
163. Id.
164. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 471-72 (2007); Behavioral Genetics Evi-
dence, supra note 19, at 339-41.
165. Landrigan v. Stewart, 397 F.3d 1235, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005).
166. Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638, 650 (9th Cir. 2006).
167. Id. ("We conclude Landrigan has alleged facts that, if demonstrated to be true,
present a colorable claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his capital
sentencing proceeding.").
168. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 481. The Supreme Court also disagreed with the en bane
court's opinion regarding Landrigan's refusal to permit the introduction of mitigating evi-
dence, finding that Landrigan "plainly ... informed his counsel not to present any mitigating
evidence." Id. at 476. Given that much of the testimony of the proffered witnesses would
have "overlap[ped] with the evidence Landrigan now wants to present," the Court held it to
be clearly established "that Landrigan would have undermined the presentation of any miti-
gating evidence that his attorney might have uncovered." Id. at 476-77. With regard to the
question of whether "Landrigan's decision not to present mitigating evidence was 'informed
and knowing,"' id at 478, the Court noted first that "[wle have never imposed [such a] re-
quirement upon a defendant's decision not to introduce evidence," id at 479, and then pro-
ceeded to outline several additional reasons why the claim was without merit. Id at 479-80
(citations omitted).
169. Id. at 481 (quoting Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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Court concluded that the district court did not abuse "its discretion in de-
clining to grant Landrigan an evidentiary hearing."' 
70
Presumably, Landrigan, like Mobley, would have implications for
other kinds of behavioral genetics evidence cases, irrespective of the types
of factors those other cases may try to introduce. 7' Both Landrigan and
Mobley questioned the value, relevance, and significance of such evidence
in the context of a defendant's appeal for mitigation. 72 At the same time, the
Supreme Court has in no way dismissed the potential applicability of behav-
ioral genetics evidence in cases where the Court may perceive the evidence
as more acceptable and the defendant as more remorseful. The Court did not
provide a test or standard suggesting how it may weigh such information in
the future; yet it did accentuate particularly negative aspects of Landrigan's
attitude and demeanor that other defendants may lack.
173
This Author's Study of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal court
cases is an effort to determine how courts have treated such evidence fol-
lowing the Landrigan Court's conclusions. As Part II shows, there is no
court that has been so dismissive of the evidence, quite the contrary. In-
stead, courts seem to take the evidence in stride with what a defendant has
to offer, whether or not that perspective changes the outcome of the defend-
ant's case.
II. BEHAVIORAL GENETICS EVIDENCE CASES: 2007-2011
This Part analyzes thirty-three criminal cases that have referred to be-
havioral genetics evidence over the past four years, that is, since June 1,
2007, when this Author's last study of behavioral genetics evidence ended,
to July 1, 201 1.17 These thirty-three cases, which are summarized in this
Article's Appendix'75 and in Charts 1-5,76 were compiled using legal re-
search databases only. 17  Other cases may exist in which behavioral genetics
170. Id.
171. Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 339-41.
172. See id. 317-30.
173. See Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 481. Given the Court's emphasis on Landrigan's
"exceedingly violent past" and absence of remorse, as well as some of the case's evidentiary
weaknesses, id., a defendant who avoided one or more of these drawbacks would have a
stronger argument.
174. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 465-98; infra App.
175. See infra App.
176. See infra Charts 1-5.
177. The case selection techniques were comparable to those used in the Author's
prior studies of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal cases. See generally Behavioral
Genetics Evidence, supra note 19; Revisiting the Legal Link, supra note 28. Searches for
decisions were conducted using LexisNexis and Westlaw, the two major legal research data-
bases. Over the years, these legal databases have expanded the content available online to
include cases that are not published and therefore not found in official legal reporters. There-
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evidence was at issue or could have been at issue; however, such cases were
not available in legal databases and likewise were not made known publicly
in a way that made them readily verifiable (for example, there were only
news articles written about them).79 This selection strategy promotes con-
sistency across cases and accountability across time periods, not only within
this particular Study, but also with the Author's earlier study of forty-eight
behavioral genetics evidence cases (1994-2007).
Of course, there are vastly different types of behavioral genetics evi-
dence, as this Article discusses.'79 It is somewhat artificial to aggregate all
the research under one heading. This type of lumping can also potentially
confuse debates about when and where such evidence should be appropri-
ately applied. The umbrella heading of "behavioral genetics evidence" is
used here, however, to make general points, while recognizing that the con-
clusions could differ in their accuracy and relevancy depending on the type
and quality of evidence at issue (for example, MAOA deficiency compared
to a family history). The next Section examines the behavioral genetics evi-
dence uncovered in this Study by answering a series of questions about
when and how courts apply it.
fore, the parameters of this Article's search included the following: published opinions,
unpublished opinions, opinions that are slated to be published, and opinions in which the
state of publication is, at the time of this Article's writing, unclear. Both LexisNexis and
Westlaw clarify an opinion's publication status when they are provided the relevant infor-
mation to do so. In order to make the content of this Article's search consistent across all
cases, the search looked only at opinions and not at the briefs for those opinions because case
briefs are not available for all cases on LexisNexis and Westlaw.
As mentioned, the search incorporated judicial decisions released between June
1, 2007, and July 1, 2011. In order to collect the relevant opinions and make the search con-
sistent with the Author's past studies, the search was limited to decisions in which courts
reference permutations of the following terms: genetics, family history, family background,
propensity, and predisposition. Some of the searches also contained the terms "mitigating"
and "aggravating." An additional search was conducted in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 131
S. Ct. 1388 (2011), by focusing on cases citing Pinholster that referenced behavioral genetics
evidence. For a discussion of Pinholster and why the case warranted this research see infra
Subsection III.D. To be included in this Article's study, a court must have announced a dis-
position in a case where a party either introduced or sought to introduce behavioral genetics
evidence at any point in the proceeding (e.g., innocence-or-guilt phase, penalty phase, post-
conviction hearing, evidentiary hearing, etc.). Cases in which behavioral genetics evidence
was introduced post-trial were included in the Study only if the court took action on the basis
of that evidence. Such action could consist of granting an evidentiary hearing on its basis,
finding ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to pursue the evidence, or find-
ing prior court error for failure to admit the evidence. The Author also required that the court
have considered the behavioral genetics evidence as part of its rationale for a particular hold-
ing.
178. A general Internet search turned up references to cases in which behavioral
genetics evidence was relevant; in most instances, however, efforts to locate such cases on
Westlaw or LexisNexis were unsuccessful.
179. See infra Subsection II.B.
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A. When and How Evidence Is Introduced
All but one of the thirty-three cases began as a capital case in which
the defendant was initially sentenced to death by a judge or jury, as Chart I
shows.18 The single exception is Morris v. Malfy i,' which started as a life-
in-prison case in which the defendant challenged his sentence claiming he
was tried and adjudicated while incompetent.'82 It is striking, then, that be-
havioral genetics evidence is of significance nearly exclusively in death
penalty cases, and it is applied in no case involving less than a life sentence.
Thus, discussions of the effects of such evidence in the guilt-or-innocence
phase of a trial, while conceptually important,'83 are not directly applicable
to situations where genetics factors are instead used as mitigation evidence
in the penalty phase of a capital trial.
Attempts to exclude such evidence therefore affect most strongly a
pocket of individuals facing the possibility of execution. The implications
can be powerful for those defendants' fates. In ten of this Study's thirty-
three cases, defendants originally sentenced to death had their death sen-
tence vacated on appeal.' In seven of those ten cases, a counsel's failure to
180. See infra Chart 1.
181. No. C 06-7409 SI, 2010 WL 2629738 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010), affd, 449 F.
App'x 686 (9th Cir. 2011).
182. Id. at * 11, * 16 (denying writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the new evidence
did not raise real questions of Morris's incompetence at the time of the crime, but issued a
certificate of appealability).
183. For an overview of an excellent literature examining the links between behav-
ioral genetics and responsibility see Stephen J. Morse, Genetics and Criminal Responsibility,
15 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 378 (2011); Mairi Levitt & Neil Manson, My Genes Made Me Do
It? The Implications of Behavioural Genetics for Responsibility and Blame, 15 HEALTH CARE
ANALYSIS 33 (2007). For a discussion of the gene-environment interaction in the context of
the balance between aggravating and mitigating factors see Stephen J. Morse, Gene-
Environment Interactions, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing, in GENE-ENVIRONMENT
INTERACTIONS IN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 207, 229-31 (Kenneth A. Dodge &
Michael Rutter eds., 2011).
184. See Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct.
2449 (2011) (vacating Detrich's death sentence and remanding the case to the district court);
Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1136 (9th Cir. 2009) (remanding the case to Tulane
County Superior Court with instructions to reduce defendant's sentence to life imprisonment
without parole); Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 647 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2091
(2011) (reversing and remanding the case with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus);
Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916, 942 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that the defendant was enti-
tled to a writ of habeas corpus and vacating his death sentence); Allison v. Cullen, 725 F.
Supp. 2d 924, 925 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (vacating the death sentence and granting relief on the
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Ex parte Smith, No. 1080973, 2010 WL
4148528, at * 13 (Ala. Oct. 22, 2010) (remanding the case for another penalty-phase hearing);
Hall v. McPherson, 663 S.E.2d 659, 670 (Ga. 2008) (upholding the habeas court's vacation
of the defendant's death sentence); Woodall v. Simpson, No. 5:06CV-P216-R, 2009 WL
464939, at *55 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2009) (vacating the death sentence and remanding the
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adequately investigate or present behavioral genetics evidence (mostly
along with other factors) was grounds for vacating a death sentence and
remanding for imposition of a sentence of life in prison.'85 In yet another
case, the court granted an evidentiary hearing where the petitioner claimed
that his counsel's failure to find witnesses and records on his background
constituted ineffective assistance.1 6 According to the petitioner, an adequate
investigation would have revealed a range of disorders: a genetic predispo-
sition to alcoholism and mental illness; a childhood filled with "physical
abuse, neglect, abandonment, and poverty"; as well as mental illnesses that
were never treated, "including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder
('PTSD'), attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder, and polysubstance
abuse."' 87 Because alcoholism and violence were prevalent in the petition-
er's family, the mitigating evidence that counsel ignored "would have
shown that petitioner was born 'into a family marked by extreme pathology
and dysfunction over multiple generations."" 8
This Author's prior analysis of forty-eight behavioral genetics evi-
dence cases (from 1994-2007) showed that attorneys employed three basic
case to state trial court); Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 215, 230 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007)
(reversing the defendant's death sentence); Commonwealth v. Williams, Nos. 200001876,
200002869, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at *15 (Pa. D. & C. May 13, 2010)
(vacating the death sentence and sentencing the defendant to life in prison).
185. See Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038, 1065, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated,
131 S. Ct. 2449 (2011) (vacating death sentence on finding that failure to include mitigating
evidence of Detrich's neuropsychological damage, along with his traumatic and abusive
childhood, was ineffective assistance of counsel); Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1135-
36 (9th Cir. 2009) (reducing defendant's sentence to life imprisonment without parole on
finding that failure to investigate and present evidence of defendant's childhood and mental
health history was prejudicial to the defendant); Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 643, 647 (9th
Cir. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2091 (2011) (issuing a writ of habeas on finding that defense
counsel had failed to conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation and present sufficient
witnesses and evidence at sentencing); Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916, 942 (6th Cir.
2007) (vacating the death sentence on finding that failure of the defense counsel to conduct
an investigation for mitigating evidence, primarily evidence of alcoholism in the family,
Morales's own alcoholism and its effects on him, and his upbringing, constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel); Allison v. Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 924, 925 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (grant-
ing relief on Allison's ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present mitigating evi-
dence claim, as well as several other claims); Hall v. McPherson, 663 S.E.2d 659, 664 (Ga.
2008) (upholding vacation of death sentence on finding that the defendant's trial counsel
should have investigated further into his background and failure to do so was due to inatten-
tion, rather than to a strategic decision); Commonwealth v. Williams, Nos. 200001876,
200002869, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at *15 (Pa. D. & C. May 13, 2010)
(vacating the death sentence on finding that Williams was mentally retarded and therefore
ineligible for the death penalty).
186. See Hawkins v. Wong, No. CIV S-96-1155 MCE EFB DP, 2010 WL 3516399,
at *92 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010).
187. Id. at *89.
188. Id. (citations omitted).
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rationales for presenting this evidence: (1) to support a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel; (2) to provide proof and diagnosis of a defendant's
mitigating condition; and (3) to indicate some likelihood of the defendant's
future dangerousness. As Chart 2 shows, however, in this Article's exami-
nation of thirty-three cases during the last four years, attorneys used only
the first two of these three rationales (thereby eliminating the rationale of
future dangerousness).' 89 The great majority of cases (twenty-six cases or
seventy-nine percent) involved petitions and appeals by defendants based on
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to present
behavioral genetics evidence adequately. 9 ° In addition to applying behav-
ioral genetics evidence to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, some de-
fendants also incorporated the evidence to prove the existence of a mitigat-
ing factor. Indeed, nearly half of the cases (fifteen cases or forty-five per-
cent) used behavioral genetics evidence to prove or support a diagnosis of a
defendant's mitigating condition. 9' Of course, some of the thirty-three cases
189. See infra Chart 2.
190. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1404 (2011); Worthington v. Roper,
631 F.3d 487, 494 (8th Cir. 2011); Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1045-46 (9th Cir.
2010); Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1236 (9th Cir. 2010); Williams v. Norris, 612 F.3d
941, 946 (8th Cir. 2010); Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1117; Morales, 507 F.3d at 931; Purkey v.
United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG, 2010 WL 4386532, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2010);
Hawkins, 2010 WL 3516399, at *90; Darling v. Sec'y, No. 6:07-cv-1701-Orl-31GJK, 2010
WL 2471441, at *19 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2010); Creech v. Hardison, No. CV 99-0224-S-
BLW, 2010 WL 1338126, at *10 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2010); Turner v. Epps, No. 4:07CV77-
WAP, 2010 WL 653880, at *10- 11 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2010); Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82957, at *6; Detrich, 619 F.3d at 1050; Henry v. Ryan, No. CV 02-656-PHX-SRB,
2009 WL 2808220, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2009); Jones, 583 F.3d at 632; Rienhardt v.
Ryan, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1050-51 (D. Ariz. 2009); Woodall v. Simpson, No. 5:06CV-
P215-R, 2009 WL 464939, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2009); Wood v. Schriro, No. CV-98-
053-TUC-JMR, 2007 WL 3124451, at *29 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 2007); Schurz v. Schriro, No.
CV-97-580-PHX-EHC, 2007 WL 3124451, at *13 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007); Berryman v.
Ayers, No. 1:95-CV-05309-AWI, 2007 WL 1991049, at *74 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2007); Lov-
ing v. United States, 68 M.J. 1, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2009); Hall, 663 S.E.2d at 660; Malone v.
State, 168 P.3d 185, 223 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512,
518, 525 (Pa. 2011); Keough v. State, No. W2008-01916-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL 2612937,
at *21-22 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2010). Of the seven behavioral genetics evidence cases
that were successful in vacating a death sentence, six were based on claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The exception was Commonwealth v. Williams, which concerned a
claim that the defendant was mentally retarded. 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at
* 13-14. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
191. See Worthington, 631 F.3d at 494; Detrich, 619 F.3d at 1063; Hamilton, 583
F.3d at 1127-28; Hawkins, 2010 WL 3516399, at *91; Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82957, at *133-36; Morris v. Malfi, No. CV 06-7409 SI, 2010 WL 2629738, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
June 29, 2010); Turner, 2010 WL 653880, at *10-11; Worthington v. Roper, 619 F. Supp. 2d
661, 667, 681-83 (E.D. Mo. 2009); Henry, 2009 WL 692356, at *65-67; Woodall, 2009 WL
464939, at *44-50; Hall v. Quarterman, No. 4:06-CV-436-A, 2009 WL 612559, at *12-15
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2009); Wood, 2007 WL 3124451, at *29-31; Ex parte Smith, No.
1080973, 2010 WL 4148528, at *4 (Ala. Oct. 22, 2010); Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276, 1280
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relied on both rationales (ineffective assistance and proof of diagnosis),
thereby creating an overlap between the categories. Strikingly, no case uti-
lized behavioral genetics evidence to indicate the likelihood of a defend-
ant's future dangerousness; indeed, only three of the forty-eight cases in this
Author's prior study appeared to incorporate behavioral genetics evidence
for this purpose."' This finding is significant in light of prior concerns (ex-
pressed by Landrigan, for example) that such evidence would be used to
predict defendants' future dangerousness (or some variant of that theme).'93
In fact, there is little-to-no indication that such an application would pose a
real legal threat.'94
Chart 3 considers the purpose that attorneys have for relying on be-
havioral genetics evidence in the death penalty context.'95 Notably, in all but
four of the thirty-three cases, the evidence is used to mitigate a death sen-
tence. In an additional three cases,'96 behavioral genetics evidence was
(Fla. 2009); Malone, 168 P.3d at 195; Williams, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at
*6.
192. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 345-48; see also infra note
201 and accompanying text.
193. See Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).
[A]lthough Landrigan's new evidence can be called mitigating in some slight
sense, it would also have shown the court that it could anticipate that he would
continue to be violent. He had already done that to a fare-thee-well. The prospect
was chilling; before he was 30 years of age, Landrigan had murdered one man, re-
peatedly stabbed another one, escaped from prison, and within two months mur-
dered still another man .... On this record, assuring the court that genetics made
him the way he is could not have been very helpful.
Id.
The Supreme Court quoted the Ninth Circuit's latter phrases, stating that it could not explain
the reasoning any better. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 481 (2007).
"The prospect was chilling; before he was 30 years of age, Landrigan had mur-
dered one man, repeatedly stabbed another one, escaped from prison, and within
two months murdered still another man .... On this record, assuring the court that
genetics made him the way he is could not have been very helpful."
Id; see also supra notes 148-73 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions).
194. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 345-49.
195. See infra Chart 3.
196. In three of the thirty-three cases in this survey, defendants attempted to admit
evidence of a genetic predisposition to mental retardation to prove they were ineligible for
the death penalty. See Hall, 2009 WL 612559, at *18 (upholding the trial court's imposition
of the death penalty after reviewing evidence that the defendant exhibited characteristics
consistent with genetic disorders such as XXY, Kleinfelter Syndrome, YYX, Extra Y Chro-
mosome, or Fragile X Syndrome, all of which would be present from birth and would be
indicative of mental retardation); Smith, 2010 WL 4148528, at *2 (affirming the trial court's
determination that the defendant was not mentally retarded after the defendant presented
evidence that he was born with a genetic predisposition to mental retardation and that five
members of his immediate family suffer from the same mental infirmity); Williams, 2010 Pa.
Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at *6 (finding that the defendant was mentally retarded and
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raised to support a claim under Atkins v. Virginia.97 In Atkins, the Supreme
Court held that executing mentally retarded individuals violates the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.'98 Of course, until
2002, Atkins was not an available vehicle in which to incorporate behavioral
genetics evidence although it is a particularly apt place for it now. Lastly, in
Morris v. Mafl, 99 as mentioned, the only non-death penalty case, behavior-
al genetics evidence was interjected to support arguments that the defendant
was not competent to stand trial, the only case in this survey that raised a
competency argument.2°
Most surprisingly, in no case in this Study did the State introduce be-
havioral genetics evidence in any capacity, much less as an aggravating
factor. As mentioned, this Author's pre-2007 study did find three cases in
which behavioral genetics evidence appeared to be used to indicate a de-
fendant's future dangerousness. 2°' Yet, such a rare occurrence within a pool
of eighty-one cases examined during a seventeen-year period stunts prior
expectations that such evidence would be manipulated to justify the death
penalty. This outcome may also be explained in part by the increasing quali-
ty of the admitted experts and evidence, which could preclude extreme
characterizations or conclusions that a defendant may be "hard-wired" into
dangerousness. While behavioral genetics evidence is viewed as a double-
edged sword, each side of that sword is not the direct flip of the other. The
hurdles for the State are substantially different from those for the defense
and their evidence and arguments may not be comparably compelling.
B. The Types of Evidence Introduced
This Section covers a wide span of information under the title, "types
of evidence introduced." The discussion starts with an overview of the four
overlapping categories of types of evidence, then also considers what kinds
of expert witnesses are needed to present it. Included is an examination of
courts' perceptions of the experts and the substance of their testimony, es-
pecially in the context of defendants' claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Overall, the analysis illustrates the wide variety of factors that
come into play in capital cases and the need for a case-by-case perspective.
therefore ineligible for the death penalty after evaluating expert opinions, including testimo-
ny that the defendant was born with "some genetic predisposition to mental retardation").
197. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
198. Id. at320-21.
199. No. C 06-7409 SI, 2010 WL 2629738 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010), aff'd, 449 F.
App'x 686 (9th Cir. 2011).
200. Id. at *1l.
201. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 345-48; see also supra note
192 and accompanying text.
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Chart 4 shows specifically the nature of the behavioral genetics evi-
dence sought to be admitted in these cases. 2 This evidence breaks down
into four overlapping categories (signifying that some cases have multiple
types of evidence): (1) expert testimony,203 (2) family history,"° (3) behav-
ioral history,2 5 and (4) medical history.2 6 Behavioral histories could consist
of school records or other testimony regarding childhood behavior relevant
to genetic disorder diagnoses. 207 Medical records could comprise any docu-
mented medical history be it physical or psychological.0 8
202. See infra Chart 4.
203. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010); Detrich v.
Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038, 1063 (9th Cir. 2010); Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 634 (9th Cir.
2009); Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1128 (9th Cir. 2009); Morales v. Mitchell, 507
F.3d 916, 944 (6th Cir. 2007); Allison v. Cullen, No. CV 92-06404 CAS, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82957, at *168-72 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2010); Darling v. Sec'y, No. 6:07-cv-1701-
Orl-31GJK, 2010 WL 2471441, at *22-23 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2010); Morris, 2010 WL
2629738, at *9; Creech v. Hardison, No. CV 99-0224-S-BLW, 2010 WL 1338126, at *10
(D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2010); Henry v. Ryan, No. CV 02-656-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL 692356, at
*69 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2009); Hall v. Quarterman, No. 4:06-CV-436-A, 2009 WL 612559, at
*17-18 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2009); Woodall v. Simpson, No. 5:06CV-P216-R, 2009 WL
464939, at *48 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2009); Wood v. Schriro, No. CV-98-053-TUC-JMR,
2007 WL 3124451, at *30 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 2007); Schurz v. Schriro, No. CV-97-580-PHX-
EHC, 2007 WL 2808220, at *40-41 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007); Williams v. Norris, No.
5:07cv00234 SWW, 2008 WL 4820559, at *14 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 4, 2008); Berryman v.
Ayers, No. 1:95-CV-05309-AWI, 2007 WL 1991049, at *14-15 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2007);
Loving v. United States, 68 M.J. 1, 14-15 (C.A.A.F. 2009); Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276,
1283 (Fla. 2009); Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1139 (Fla. 2009); Hall v. McPherson, 663
S.E.2d 659, 667 (Ga. 2008); Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 195 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007);
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512, 519 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Williams, Nos.
200001876, 200002869, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at *6-8 (Pa. D. & C. May
13, 2010); Keough v. State, No. W2008-01916-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL 2612937, at *13
(Tenn. June 30, 2010).
204. See Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2010); Jones, 583 F.3d
at 634; Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1127-28; Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG,
2010 WL 4386532, at *2-3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2010); Hawkins v. Wong, No. CV. S-96-
1155, 2010 WL 3516399, at *89 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010); Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82957, at *134-36, * 145; Morris, 2010 WL 2629738, at *7; Turner v. Epps, No. 4:07CV77-
WAP, 2010 WL 653880, at *13 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2010); Henry, 2009 WL 692356, at
*74; Williams, 2008 WL 4820559, at *14; Wood, 2007 WL 3124451, at *30-31; Schurz,
2007 WL 2808220, at *40-41; Loving, 68 M.J. at 14; Exparte Smith, No. 1080973, 2010
WL 4148528, at *4 (Ala. Oct. 22, 2010); Brant, 21 So. 3d at 1280; Hall, 663 S.E.2d at 667;
Malone, 168 P.3d at 195; Keough, 2010 WL 2612937, at *13.
205. See Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957, at *169-71; Henry, 2009 WL
692356, at *65; Rienhardt v. Ryan, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1052 (D. Ariz. 2009); Berryman,
2007 WL 1991049, at *78.
206. See Detrich, 619 F.3d at 1063; Jones, 583 F.3d at 631; Worthington v. Rop-
er, 619 F. Supp. 2d 661, 682-83 (E.D. Miss. 2009).
207. See infra Chart 4.
208. See infra Chart 4.
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As would be expected, most of the information in Chart 4 derives
from some kind of expert evaluation or family history (twenty-four and
eighteen cases, respectively), rather than a behavioral or medical history
(four and three cases, respectively)." 9 However, there is overlap between
these two categories given that in several of the cases, experts testified to
some extent about the defendants' family histories." ' In general, all four
groups are directed toward similar types of information even if its source
varies or it is characterized in different ways.
Family history evidence is especially diverse and has been used to
show genetic predispositions towards many different conditions."' It is of-
ten introduced through the testimony of the defendant's relatives and also
through expert testimony."' While in some cases, the behavioral genetics
209. See infra Chart 4.
210. See Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (presenting evidence
of head injuries and presenting expert testimony that the defendant had neuropsychological
deficits (some of which may have been inherited) that prevented him from controlling his
impulses); Allison v. Cullen, No. CV 92-06404 CAS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957, at
* 135-36 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) (presenting family history of alcoholism and depression);
Worthington, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 682 (presenting evidence of defendant's medical history,
including genetic predisposition to and a family history of depression, bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia and inherited brain dysfunction); Williams v. Norris, No. 5:07cv00234 SWW,
2008 WL 4820559, at *14 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 4, 2008) (presenting defendant's social, physical,
educational, and family history); Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2009)
(presenting expert witness testimony that defendant had a family history of genetic disorders
and a traumatic upbringing); Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276, 1282 (Fla. 2009) (presenting
expert testimony from a forensic psychologist that defendant was genetically predisposed to
sexual sadism and also presenting defendant's mother's testimony about a family history of
depression); Hall v. McPherson, 663 S.E.2d 659, 667 (Ga. 2008) (presenting expert testimo-
ny from a psychiatrist about defendant's family tree showing a genetic predisposition to
substance dependence disorder); Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276, 1282 (Fla. 2009) (presenting
expert testimony from a forensic psychologist that defendant was genetically predisposed to
sexual sadism and also presenting defendant's mother's testimony about a family history of
depression).
211. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1404, 1425 (2011) (family history of
alcohol abuse used to support the theory that defendant might have a genetic predisposition
to substance abuse and family history of mental illness); Hawkins v. Wong, No. Civ. S-96-
1155 MCE EFB DP, 2010 WL 3516399, at *91 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010) (defendant sought a
social historian who could have testified to his family tree, which "included many alcoholics,
indicating a family genetic predisposition to alcoholism ... [and which also] included many
violent, abusive, and mentally ill or handicapped persons."); Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82957, at * 169 (family history of alcoholism and depression); Worthington, 619 F. Supp. 2d
at 672, 682-83 (family history of depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and inherited
brain dysfunction); Ex parte Smith, No. 1080973, 2010 WL 4148528, at *4 (Ala. Oct. 22,
2010) (mental retardation); Brant, 21 So.3d at 1280 (depression); Hall, 663 S.E.2d at 667
(substance dependence disorder); Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 195 (Okla. Crim. App.
2007) (addiction and depression); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512, 519 (Pa. 2011)
(alcohol abuse).
212. For expert testimony on behavioral genetics see Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d
1027, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2011); Detrich, 619 F.3d at 1063; Jones, 583 F.3d at 633-34; Mo-
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evidence presented consisted almost wholly of the defendant's family histo-
ry,213 in other cases, defendants had requested experts to assess the mitiga-
tion value of establishing a genetic predisposition towards a condition or
behavior. For instance, in Rhoades v. Henry,1 4 the defendant submitted a
1000-page proffer on appeal, which contained declarations from a variety of
sources: a neuropsychologist; an expert who was both a psychiatrist and
neurologist; police officers; the defendant's family and friends; medical and
criminal records for both the defendant and his family members; the de-
fendant's elementary school transcript; as well as "a family tree depicting
drug and alcohol abuse, suicide, intelligence, mental health, and criminal
convictions.""2 5 According to the neuropsychologist, "'The alcoholism and
suicides seen in past generations of [the defendant's] family very likely
played a genetic role in the mental and emotional health of [the defendant]
and his siblings.""'2 6 Nonetheless, it was the family context of physical and
sexual abuse, as well as medical problems and the defendant's chronic use
of methamphetamine, that "may well have damaged [the defendant's] brain
in areas critical to impulse control and the ability to think clearly in high
rales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916, 944 (6th Cir. 2007); Morris v. Malfi, No. C 06-7409 SI, 2010
WL 2629738, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010); Rienhardt v. Ryan, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1038,
1052 (D. Ariz. 2009); Brant, 21 So. 3d at 1283; Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1139 (Fla.
2009); Hall, 663 S.E.2d at 667; Malone, 168 P.3d at 195; Gibson, 19 A.3d at 519; Com-
monwealth v. Williams, Nos. 200001876, 200002869, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS
193, at *6 (Pa. D. & C. May 13, 2010).
213. See Hawkins, 2010 WL 3516399, at *91 (defendant sought a social historian
who could have testified to his family tree, which included many alcoholics, indicating a
family genetic predisposition to alcoholism, and which also "included many violent, abusive,
and mentally ill or handicapped persons"); Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957, at *169
(an expert witness suggested that defendant's family history showed that he might have a
genetic predisposition to alcoholism, substance abuse, and mental illness); Turner v. Epps,
No. 4:07CV77-WAP, 2010 WL 653880, at *13 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2010) (family history of
mental illness, including a grandmother who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia; genetic
predisposition to mental illness); Worthington, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 682 (genetic predisposition
to and family history of depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia, and inherited brain
dysfunction); Henry v. Ryan, No. CV 02-656-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL 692356, at *74 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 17, 2009) (defendant had a family history of schizophrenia and exhibited symptoms as
a child); Williams v. Norris, No. 5:07cv00234 SWW, 2008 WL 4820559, at *12 (E.D. Ark.
Nov. 4, 2008) (defendant "experienced family dysfunction which extended from 'generation
to generation ') (internal cross references omitted); Wood v. Schriro, No. CV-98-053-TUC-
JMR, 2007 WL 3124451, at *31 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 2007) (family history of alcoholism);
Gibson, 19 A.3d at 519 (family history of alcohol abuse used to support the concept that
defendant might have a genetic predisposition to substance abuse); Keough v. State, No.
W2008-01916-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL 2612937, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2010) (a
specialist in addiction medicine testified that alcoholism is genetic and that defendant had a
family history of alcoholism).
214. 638 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2011).
215. Id. at 1048.
216. Id.
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pressured situations." ' 7 Even so, the court found that the aggravating fac-
tors outweighed the mitigating factors, and the defendant's sentence and
convictions were affirmed.2t 8
The defendant in Hawkins v. Wong 9 had a more favorable outcome.2
He claimed that his counsel was ineffective for, among other things, failing
to hire a social historian who could have explained how the defendant's
background influenced his behavior.2 2' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the defendant that his counsel was ineffective. The mitigating
evidence would have shown that Hawkins was genetically predisposed to
alcoholism and mental illness.22 A social historian could have also testified
about Hawkins's family tree, which included many alcoholics and indicated
a family genetic predisposition to alcoholism, as well as included a range of
violent, abusive, and mentally ill or handicapped persons. 223 The court al-
lowed an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.224
As with other kinds of evidence, courts vary on whether behavioral
genetics information need be presented by experts. Some courts have said
that an expert is not necessary to testify about behavioral genetics factors
because the court or the jury is capable of inferring that a defendant's dispo-
sition is inherited. For example, in Hodges v. Bell,225 the defendant wanted a
mitigation expert to testify about the genetic transmission of drug and alco-
hol dependency. 26 The trial court's decision to deny expert services was
upheld because counsel was deemed capable of presenting to the court in-
formation about the defendant's substance addictions and the court was able
to process that information without the need for an expert.227 In Woodall v.
Simpson,228 the failure to present a genetic defect defense was also not inef-
fective assistance of counsel because the court found that the jury could
have inferred that, genetically, the defendant's family had a history of men-
tal problems.29 In Darling v. Secretary,23° the court determined that since
there was contradictory evidence concerning whether the defendant actually
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1052, 1055.
219. No. CIV. S-96-1155 MCE EFB DP, 2010 WL 3516399 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2,
2010).




224. Id. at *92.
225. 548 F. Supp. 2d 485 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).
226. Id. at 546.
227. Id. at 547.
228. No. 5:06CV-P216-R, 2009 WL 464939 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2009).
229. Id. at *48.
230. No. 6:07-cv-1701-Orl-31GJK, 2010 WL 2471441 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2010).
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suffered from frontal lobe brain damage, counsel was not ineffective in fail-
ing to obtain an evaluation and relying instead on a defense witness's testi-
mony.23' Likewise, the court in Wood v. Schriro2 2 denied defense counsel's
request for a neurometric brainmapping technician for the purpose of diag-
nosing organic brain damage and/or psychopathology in the defendant, find-
ing that "there appear[ed] to be no support for this type of examination." '33
Despite the lack of complete deference to mental health experts, at
least one court has acknowledged the tension between the legal field and
medical field. In Jones v. Ryan,3 the district court dismissed each ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim on finding that the failure to hire a mental
health expert (among other claims) was not prejudicial to the defendant be-
cause there was not enough evidence presented to show that the defendant
suffered from neurological damage caused by head trauma or other fac-
tors.235 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, agreed with the de-
fendant that his counsel was ineffective.236 By allowing a court-appointed
expert to testify about the defendant's mental health at sentencing, instead
of hiring a mitigation expert or psychiatrist, defense counsel violated the
American Bar Association guidelines, Supreme Court precedent, and Ninth
Circuit law.237 The court found that the district court acted improperly in
weighing the testimony of the experts in order to determine who was the
most credible and whether the defendant had presented evidence confirming
that he had neurological damage. 38 In essence, it was not the proper role of
the district court to find a "definitive diagnosis" or to evaluate the credibil-
ity of the experts. 39
For any one of a number of reasons, other courts seem to be more
comfortable drawing conclusions about behavioral genetics evidence pre-
sented by experts. In Hall v. Quarterman,24 ° for example, the district court
noted testimony presented by and against the defendant on the issue of men-
tal retardation and stated some of the genetic conditions the defendant might
have.24' Rather than frame mental health findings strictly in terms of the
expert's direct testimony, the district court took the expert's findings and
drew its own conclusions with respect to the possibilities. According to the
court:
231. Id. at *28.
232. No. CV-98-053-TUC-JMR, 2007 WL 3124451 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 2007).
233. Id. at *30.
234. 583 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2009).
235. Id. at 635-36.
236. Id. at 640.
237. Id. at 638.
238. Id. at 641.
239. Id.
240. No. 4:06-CV-436-A, 2009 WL 612559 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2009).
241. Id. at*18.
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In addition to [the expert, Dr. Sally Church's] diagnosis that Applicant is mentally
retarded, Dr. Church note[d] that Applicant's physical appearance is typical of a
person who suffers from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome or Fetal Alcohol Effect. It is en-
tirely possible that Applicant suffers from one of these conditions as there is evi-
dence that Applicant's mother was an alcoholic. Either of these conditions would
be a correlate of Applicant's mental retardation.
Also, Applicant exhibits characteristics consistent with genetic disorders such as
XXY, Kleinfelter Syndrome, YYX, Extra Y Chromosome, or Fragile X Syndrome.
All of these disorders are usually related to mental retardation and are present at
the time of birth.242
C. Why Evidence Is Introduced
Regardless of how behavioral genetics evidence is presented, Chart 5
indicates that most of the evidence is applied to validate the existence of a
serious condition, typically a mental illness or addiction. A defendant could
introduce this evidence as mitigation during the penalty phase or at trial
during the guilt-or-innocence phase, irrespective of whether that evidence
was accompanied by genetic associations.2 43 Therefore, most of the factors
listed in Chart 5 constitute traditional kinds of defenses and mitigating evi-
dence that courts have long admitted into court for a wide range of reasons.
Chart 5 also depicts the different reasons defendants have offered for
submitting behavioral genetics information and how receptive courts have
been to it.2" Chart 5's label, Genetics Evidence Offered by Defendant, refers
to instances where defendants presented evidence to show they were genet-
ically predisposed toward a particular condition or behavioral pattern. In
comparison, the label Genetics Evidence Rejected by Court, refers to the
few instances where courts refused to admit behavioral genetics evidence
either at trial or in post-trial proceedings or they were simply silent on the
issue.
Overall, Chart 5's statistics indicate that in almost all cases where a
defendant presented behavioral genetics evidence, the court admitted the
evidence at trial or analyzed the evidence in post-trial proceedings.245 This
response was consistent among all of Chart 5's eleven categories: substance
dependency,2" alcohol dependency,247 mental illness,248 depression,249 mental
242. Id.
243. See infra Chart 5. The total number of cases exceeds the number of examined
cases (thirty-three), because in some cases the evidence was applied to validate more than
one condition.
244. See infra Chart 5.
245. See infra Chart 5.
246. See infra Chart 5, SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCY. For cases where evidence
was offered to the court see Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1404 (2011); Worthington
v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 493, 501, 510 (8th Cir. 2011); Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027,
1048-49 (9th Cir. 2010); Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1247 (9th Cir. 2010); Jones v.
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retardation,25 ° bipolar disorder, 5  schizophrenia, predisposition towardviolence, 253 propensity toward criminal behavior, 4 sexual sadism,255 and
Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 632-34 (9th Cir. 2009) (9th Cir. 2009); Rienhardt v. Ryan, 669 F. Supp.
2d 1038, 1052 (D. Ariz. 2009); Hodges v. Bell, 548 F. Supp. 2d 485, 491 (M.D. Tenn. 2008);
Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG, 2010 WL 4386532, at *6 n.l (W.D. Mo.
Oct. 28, 2010); Allison v. Cullen, No. CV 92-06404 CAS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957, at
*169 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2010); Darling v. Sec'y, No. 6:07-cv-1701-Orl-31GJK, 2010 WL
2471441, at *24 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2010); Schurz v. Schriro, No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC,
2007 WL 2808220, at *42 (D. Ariz, Sept. 25, 2007); Loving v. United States, 68 M.J. 1, 14-
15 (C.A.A.F. 2009); Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1139 (Fla. 2009); Hall v. Mcpherson,
663 S.E.2d 659, 667 (Ga. 2008); Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 195 (Okla. 2007); Com-
monwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512, 519 (Pa. 2011). This evidence was rejected in
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1404; Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1236, 1247 (9th Cir. 2010).
247. See infra Chart 5, ALCOHOL DEPENDENCY. For cases where evidence was
offered to the court see Rhoades, 638 F.3d at 1048-49; Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916,
931 (6th Cir. 2007); Worthington v. Roper, 619 F. Supp. 2d 661, 683 (E.D. Mo. 2009);
Rienhardt, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 1052; Hodges, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 491; Purkey, 2010 WL
4386532, at *6 n.I; Hawkins v. Wong, No. CV. S-96-1155, 2010 WL 3516399, at *91 (E.D.
Cal. Sept. 2, 2010); Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957, at *169; Wood v. Schriro, No.
CV-98-053-TUC-JMR, 2007 WL 3124451, at *29-31 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 2007); Schurz, 2007
WL 2808220, at *42; Berryman v. Ayers, No. 1:95-CV-05309-AWI, 2007 WL 1991049, at
*68-70 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2007); Loving, 68 M.J. at 15; Simpson, 3 So. 3d at 1139; Keough
v. State, No. W2008-01916-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL 2612937, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. June
30, 2010). This evidence was rejected in Berryman, 2007 WL 1991049, at *85 (E.D. Cal.
July 10, 2007); Keough, 2010 WL 2612937, at *23.
248. See infra Chart 5, MENTAL ILLNESS. For cases where evidence was offered to
the court see Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1404; Worthington, 631 F.3d at 494; Detrich v.
Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038, 1063 (9th Cir. 2010); Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1126-28 (9th
Cir. 2009); Hawkins, 2010 WL 3516399, at *91; Allison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957, at
*172-73; Turner v. Epps, No. 4:07CV77-WAP, 2010 WL 653880, at *13 (N.D. Miss. Feb.
19, 2010); Woodall v. Simpson, No. 5:06CV-P216-R, 2009 WL 464939, at *43 (W.D. Ky.
Feb. 24, 2009); Wood, 2007 WL 3124451, at *29-30. This evidence was rejected in
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1404.
249. See infra Chart 5, DEPRESSION. For cases where evidence was offered to the
court see Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1127-28; Worthington, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 667, 681-82;
Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276, 1280 (Fla. 2009); Malone, 168 P.3d at 195.
250. See infra Chart 5, MENTAL RETARDATION. For cases where evidence was
offered to the court see Hall v. Quarterman, No. 4:06-CV-436-A, 2009 WL 612559, at *33,
*40 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2009); Exparte Smith, No. 1080973, 2010 WL 4148528, at *4 (Ala.
Oct. 22, 2010); Commonwealth v. Williams, Nos. 200001876, 200002869, 2010 Pa. Dist. &
Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at *6 (Pa. D. & C. May 13, 2010). This evidence was rejected in
Smith, 2010 WL 4148528, at *7, *13.
251. See infra Chart 5, BIPOLAR DISORDER. For a case where evidence was of-
fered to the court see Worthington, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 681-82.
252. See infra Chart 5, SCHIZOPHRENIA. For cases where evidence was offered to
the court see Worthington, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 682; Morris v. Malfi, No. 06-7409 SI, 2010
WL 2629738, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010); Henry v. Ryan, No. CV 02-656-PHX-SRB,
2009 WL 692356, at *65 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2009).
253. See infra Chart 5, PREDISPOSITION TOWARD VIOLENCE. For a case where
evidence was offered to the court see Creech v. Hardison, No. CV 99-0224-S-BLW, 2010
WL 1338126, at *10 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2010).
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family dysfunction.256 It is striking that behavioral genetics evidence is pri-
marily used to validate the existence of a substance or alcohol dependency,
followed by either unspecified or specified (e.g., depression) mental illness,
then some kind of propensity for criminality or violence, and lastly, family
dysfunction. Relative to these other conditions, however, the sub-
stance/alcohol dependency association is especially pronounced. In twenty
of the thirty-three cases examined-or well over half (sixty-one percent) of
all the cases-courts found a link between alcohol and/or substance abuse
and behavioral genetics evidence." 7 In sharp contrast, courts linked behav-
ioral genetics evidence solely to other conditions in only thirteen cases (thir-
ty-nine percent). 58 It is important to note that in most cases where a defend-
ant presented evidence of a genetic predisposition to alcohol or substance
254. See infra Chart 5, PROPENSITY TOWARD CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR. For
cases where evidence was offered to the court see Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1404
(2011); Rienhardt v. Ryan, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1052 (D. Ariz. 2009).
255. See infra Chart 5, SEXUAL SADISM. For a case where evidence was offered to
the court see Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276, 1281 (Fla. 2009).
256. See infra Chart 5, FAMILY DYSFUNCTION. For cases where evidence was
offered to the court see Williams v. Norris, 612 F.3d 941, 945 (8th Cir. 2010); Worthington,
619 F. Supp. 2d at 667; Schurz v. Schriro, No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC, 2007 WL 2808220, at
*41, *47 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007); Loving v. United States, 68 M.J. 1, 14 (2009).
257. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1404; Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 493,
501, 510 (8th Cir. 2011); Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2010); Mickey
v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1236, 1247 (9th Cir. 2010); Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 632-34
(9th Cir. 2009); Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916, 931 (6th Cir. 2007); Rienhardt, 669 F.
Supp. 2d at 1052; Hodges v. Bell, 548 F. Supp. 2d 485, 491 (M.D. Tenn. 2008); Purkey v.
United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2010); Allison v. Cullen,
No. CV 92-06404 CAS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957, at *169 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2010);
Darling v. Sec'y, No. 6:07-cv-1701-Orl-3IGJK, 2010 WL 2471441, at *22 (M.D. Fla. June
17, 2010); Wood v. Schriro, No. CV-98-053-TUC-JMR, 2007 WL 3124451, at *45 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 24, 2007); Schurz, 2007 WL 2808220, at *40-41 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007); Berryman v.
Ayers, No. I:95-CV-05309-AWI, 2007 WL 1991049, at *17 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2007); Lov-
ing, 68 M.J. at 14-15; Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1139 (Fla. 2009); Hall v. Mcpherson,
663 S.E.2d 659, 667 (Ga. 2008); Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 195 (Okla. 2007); Com-
monwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512, 519 (Pa. 2011); Keough v. State, No. W2008-01916-
CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL 2612937, at 36 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2010).
258. See Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038, 1063 (9th Cir. 2010); Williams, 612 F.3d at
945; Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2009); Hawkins v. Wong, No.
C1V S-96-1155 MCE EFB DP, 2010 WL 3516399, at *91 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010); Morris
v. Malfi, No. 06-7409 SI, 2010 WL 2629738, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010); Creech, 2010
WL 1338126, at 10; Turner v. Epps, No. 4:07CV77-WAP, 2010 WL 653880, at *25 (N.D.
Miss. Feb. 19, 2010); Henry v. Ryan, No. CV 02-656-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL 692356, at *65
(D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2009); Hall v. Quarterman, No. 4:06-CV-436-A, 2009 WL 612559, at
*33, *3940 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2009); Woodall v. Simpson, No. 5:06CV-P216-R, 2009 WL
464939, at *43 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2009); Exparte Smith, No. 1080973, 2010 WL 4148528,
at *4 (Ala. Oct. 22, 2010); Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276, 1281 (Fla. 2009); Commonwealth
v. Williams, No. 200001876, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at *6 (Pa. Cnty. Ct.
May 13, 2010).
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dependency, that defendant also presented evidence of a genetic predisposi-
tion to other conditions. Regardless, the alcohol/substance abuse claim is
pervasive and far more substantial when compared to this Author's study of
pre-2007 cases.259 It appears attorneys are more willing to submit such evi-
dence, perhaps because the science of addiction has progressed so rapidly.
Apart from the particular type of behavioral genetics evidence, how-
ever, there are varying ways defendants offer such evidence and courts ei-
ther accept or reject it. For example, Schurz v. Schriro26 ° concerned evi-
dence involving three of Chart 5's categories: substance dependency, alco-
hol dependency, and family dysfunction.26' In Schurz, the defendant offered
evidence that his counsel should have investigated and presented the follow-
ing areas of mitigation: a genetic predisposition toward addiction and men-
tal illness; possible fetal alcohol syndrome; a history of alcoholism among
family members, including his mother, father, grandfather, grandmother,
and aunts and uncles; serious and ongoing parental neglect, chronic alcohol
and substance abuse, and physical neglect.262 In its evaluation of the merits
of the defendant's claim, the court conceded to the dysfunctionality of the
defendant's "home environment"; it noted that as a youth the defendant was
forced to experience "his family's alcoholism, verbal and physical abuse,
which was at times severe, lack of nurturing from his parents, and family
fights and violence." '263 Yet the district court still denied habeas relief, pre-
dicting that "the sentencing court would have assigned minimal significance
to the new declarations providing additional detail about Petitioner's dys-
functional family history."2"
Whether courts treat evidence of a defendant's mental retardation any
differently remains to be fully seen until a larger sample of cases evolves.
Regardless, as mentioned previously, there were three cases in this Study
where counsel introduced genetics evidence for the purpose of contending
that the defendant was mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for the
death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia.65 One of the three courts agreed with
that argument.266
Overall, most courts accepted the evidence that defendants offered,
even when that evidence could be viewed as controversial or potentially
259. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 321, 465-98.
260. No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC, 2007 WL 2808220 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007).
261. See infra Chart 5.
262. Schurz, 2007 WL 2808220, at *41.
263. Id. at *48.
264. Id. at *49.
265. 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the three cases).
266. Commonwealth v. Williams, Nos. 200001876, 200002869, 2010 Pa. Dist. &
Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at * 15 (Pa. D. & C. May 13, 2010).
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stigmatizing. In Morales v. Mitchell,267 for example, the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's finding that the defendant's counsel was ineffec-
tive because the counsel had failed to conduct an adequate investigation of
potentially mitigating evidence.268 That search would have revealed the de-
fendant's extensive family history of alcoholism, the defendant's own alco-
holism and how it affected him (such as being prone to blackouts), his up-
bringing (alcoholic and absent parents, and a mentally retarded brother), as
well as "[t]he role of alcohol in the Native American Indian culture in which
he was raised." '269 The defendant's parents, grandparents, uncle, and aunts
were alcoholics, and several relatives died from cirrhosis of the liver.70 All
of this information was positively influential in terms of mitigation. The
defendant was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, and his death sentence
was vacated. 7'
Chart 5 also lists categories that could potentially be considered as ag-
gravating at first glance but, within a proper context, could serve as mitiga-
tion.272 In Creech v. Hardison,273 for example, the defendant, Creech,
claimed ineffective assistance of counsel at his resentencing hearing due to
his counsel's inadequate research on mitigation evidence.274 According to a
psychologist who testified at Creech's resentencing hearing, Creech "proba-
bly had a genetic or biological predisposition for violence" based on the
psychologist's examination of records, mental health reports, an interview
with Creech, and the results of various psychological tests.275 The psycholo-
gist also concluded "that Creech had an antisocial personality and scored in
the 96th percentile of the prison population for psychopathy.2 76 This infor-
mation was used as mitigating evidence during the sentencing hearing for
Creech's murder of his fellow inmate. 77 On appeal, Creech also introduced
new evidence from a 2005 neurological examination, showing that he had
"'bilateral brain damage that affected [his] insight, judgment and capacity to
exercise social inhibitions.' 278 After reviewing the record, however, the
court found that "the state district court expressly considered the various
mitigating circumstances. 279 While "[a] neurologist's opinion that Creech
267. 507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2007).
268. Id. at 928-31.
269. Id. at 931.
270. Id. at 932.
271. Id. at 942.
272. See infra Chart 5.
273. No. CV 99-0224-S-BLW, 2010 WL 1338126 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2010).




278. Id. at *14 (citations omitted).
279. Id.
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has brain damage may be more specific than [the psychologist's] testimo-
ny," it offered "only a modest counterweight" to the aggravating factors
involved in Creech's case; these factors included Creech's long criminal
record as well as the "brutal manner" in which he killed a more vulnerable
fellow inmate "over a petty dispute. 28
°
Brant v. State"' is notable both because it is the only case that con-
cerned sexual sadism and because behavioral genetics evidence was men-
tioned in passing during the trial.282 According to a forensic psychiatrist for
the defense, Brant suffered from sexual sadism which "in most cases ...
arises out of a genetic predisposition and unhealthy childhood environ-
ment." '283 Concerning the sexual battery involved in the case, the psychiatrist
stated that Brant possessed "'a substantial impairment in his ability to con-
form his conduct with the requirements of the law"' because of both his
sexual sadism and the effects of methamphetamine.284 The underlying sexu-
al disorder which hindered Brant's ability to control his sexual impulses was
exacerbated when he ingested drugs.285 In addition, a PET scan of Brant's
brain indicated "underactivity" in the areas associated with impulse control
and good judgment. 86 Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed
Brant's death sentence, 87 unconvinced that the mitigating evidence out-
weighed the aggravating evidence.2 88 At the same time, the court did not
throw doubt on the validity of the behavioral genetics evidence, nor turn it
into a vehicle for aggravation.
III. THE STATE OF BEHAVIORAL GENETICS EVIDENCE Now
This Part has two goals: it discusses this Author' Study of thirty-three
behavioral genetics evidence cases in more depth and it compares the Study
to the results of this Author's prior research on forty-eight behavioral
genetics evidence cases decided between 1994-2007. This comparison is
made by way of addressing a series of questions about the findings and then
the overall impact of behavioral genetics evidence.
280. Id. at * 15.
281. 21 So. 3d 1276 (Fla. 2009).
282. Id. at 1282.
283. Id
284. Id. at 1283.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1281.
287. Id. at 1289.
288. Id. at 1286.
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A. Are Courts Still Skeptical?
1. The First Study: 1994-2007
In 1994, defense preparations for Mobley v. State289 drew world-wide
publicity because of Mobley's counsel's unprecedented efforts to gather
behavioral genetics evidence to prevent Stephen Mobley's execution.29
According to some commentators at the time, the availability of such testing
would prompt political and moral abuses of highly controversial infor-
mation.291 Yet this Author's earlier survey of the forty-eight cases that had
used behavioral genetics evidence during the thirteen years following
Mobley (1994-2007) showed no apparent basis for these concerns.292 There
were no abuses of the ilk that had been predicted and most courts still ques-
tioned the relevance of such evidence when attorneys attempted to introduce
it at the penalty phase, a tact consistent with the Supreme Court's 2007 con-
clusions in Schriro v. Landrigan.29 3
In essence, during the thirteen years between Mobley and Landrigan,
there had been seemingly few changes in social and legal attitudes toward
behavioral genetics. 294 The topic remained controversial for many of the
same reasons espoused at the 1992 University of Maryland conference.
295
Moreover, the applicability of behavioral genetics evidence as mitigation in
death penalty cases still seemed to baffle the press and public, thereby ac-
centuating the controversy.296
There were exceptions, of course, as the Susan Smith case illustrated.
In Von Dohlen v. State,297 for example, which was decided a decade after
Mobley, the court remanded the defendant's case for resentencing in light of
the mitigating evidence that attorneys presented, which had included behav-
ioral genetics factors. 298 Notably, such evidence was sufficiently compelling
even without a testifying expert documenting the defendant's genetic pro-
clivity for mental disorder or other troublesome conditions. 29 The passage
of time may have been a positive influence on Von Dohlen's outcome, alt-
hough such an explanation is speculative. Regardless, the case remains unu-
sual when compared to a larger group of opinions that have viewed behav-
289. 455 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1995).
290. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 319.
291. Id. at 349.
292. Id. at 321.
293. Id. at 350 (citing Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 480-81 (2007)).
294. Id. at 324.
295. Id. at 350; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
296. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 350.
297. 602 S.E.2d 738 (S.C. 2004).
298. Id. at 743.
299. Id. at 741-46.
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ioral genetics evidence either as inconsequential or, on a far lesser scale,
potentially predictive of a defendant's future violent tendencies."'
Consistent with Mobley"' and Landrigan,0 2 this Author's earlier study
showed that courts articulated five major reasons for rejecting a defendant's
submission of behavioral genetics evidence:3 3 (1) The mitigation evidence
the defense had already submitted was sufficient and further information
concerning the defendant's genetic attributes would most likely not have
influenced the defendant's sentence; (2) behavioral genetics evidence is not
as valid and reliable relative to other evidence introduced at trial, especially
when there is conflicting testimony among the experts; (3) an association
between a defendant's behavioral genetics and criminal behavior is "unor-
thodox" or "exotic"; (4) even if behavioral genetics evidence is accepted at
trial, it can be detrimental to a defendant's case because it indicates that the
defendant will commit further acts of violence and be a danger to society;
and (5) behavioral genetics evidence collides with some courts' views of
criminal responsibility, which may favor safeguarding the community rather
than rehabilitation.
This Author's studies provide little support for any of these five ra-
tionales. For example, both studies have shown that behavioral genetics
evidence can have a beneficial impact for some defendants in some cases,
particularly when it bolsters or interacts with other kinds of mitigating evi-
dence. 35 There are also compelling arguments that behavioral genetics evi-
dence is relevant and useful if applied in a limited way, such as to buttress
other mitigating conditions,3 6 or to verify the existence of a condition that a
court may question.30 7 Likewise, courts' rendering of behavioral genetic
factors as "unorthodox" or "exotic" ignores the reality that such information
300. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 349-51; see also supra
notes 192, 201 and accompanying text (discussing the small number of cases concerning a
defendant's future dangerousness that were reported in this Author's pre-2007 study).
301. Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 461 (Ga. 1998).
302. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 480-81 (2007).
303. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 350.
304. Id. at 351-52.
305. Id. at 352 (discussing the five stated problems concerning the use of behavioral
genetics evidence in criminal cases). Indeed, similar to some brain imaging technologies,
some behavioral genetics evidence may be more scientifically reliable than many other kinds
of evidence admitted into trial. For a discussion of this perspective in the context of brain
imaging see Adam Teitcher, Weaving Functional Brain Imaging into the Tapestry of Evi-
dence: A Case for Functional Neuroimaging in Federal Criminal Courts, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 355 (2011).
306. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 333 (listing the ways that
behavioral genetics evidence validates the existence of a serious condition).
307. See Billiot v. State, 655 So. 2d 1, 8 (Miss. 1995); Alley v. State, 958 S.W.2d
138, 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
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has a long history in legal cases,3"8 even if that past was controversial or
seemingly forgotten by more recent decisions, such as Mobley" and
Landrigan."° Indeed, this Author's research uncovered eighty-one such
cases over the past seventeen years.
The remaining rationales also lack support. While courts and commen-
tators have long-stressed the double-edged-sword aspect of behavioral ge-
netics evidence, this characteristic is inherent to many other mitigating fac-
tors. The Supreme Court's reliance on certain kinds of neuroscientific find-
ings in Roper v. Simmons"' is an apt illustration. In Roper, the Supreme
Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the exe-
cution of persons under age eighteen at the time their crimes were commit-
ted.3" The Court reasoned that relative to adults, juveniles are more imma-
ture and irresponsible, vulnerable to negative pressures from their peers and
environment, and fragile and unstable in their identities."3 Although these
disparities explained why juveniles may be less culpable, they also height-
ened the likelihood that juveniles would engage in impulsive thinking and
criminality.3"4 The very factors that argued against juveniles' eligibility for
the death penalty also made them more prone to misconduct--truly a dou-
ble-edged sword. Likewise, the argument that behavioral genetics evidence
conflicts with some courts' theories of criminal responsibility again reveals
the confusion concerning the disparate standards relevant for the guilt-or-
innocence phase of a trial as opposed to the penalty phase of a trial. The
standard for mitigation evidence is far broader given the purpose that it
serves.
31 5
Another aspect complicating these already difficult cases involves the
apparent ignorance of some courts in dealing with the interactions among
social, biological, and genetic variables. As this Article has shown, howev-
er, such variables are so intertwined it would be an artificial and misleading
process to attempt to separate them for purposes of sentencing." 6 Yet, the
latest discoveries in behavioral genetics have not fallen on courts' deaf ears
in more recent times. Indeed, the next Section's discussion of cases using
308. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 352.
309. 455 S.E.2d 61, 65-66 (Ga. 1995).
310. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 480-81 (2007).
311. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
312. Id. at 578 ("The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were commit-
ted."); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that "[t]he Consti-
tution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who
did not commit homicide").
313. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
314. Id. at570-71.
315. See supra Section I.A.
316. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
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behavioral genetics evidence during the last four years suggests that much
of this judicial skepticism has ebbed if not disappeared entirely.31 7
2. The Second Study: 2007-2011
Courts during 2007-2011 seemingly quelled questioning whether
sound behavioral genetics evidence should be admitted as mitigation at all
during the penalty phase. Rather, the question now is whether sufficient
evidence has been presented and, if so, how much weight it should be given.
In all thirty-three of the decisions this Author examined, for example, courts
appeared to at least consider behavioral genetics evidence in their analysis
of mitigating factors and whether an attorney has rendered ineffective assis-
tance. Likewise, none of the courts squarely rejected the introduction of
behavioral genetics evidence nor referred to it as "exotic" or "unorthodox."
Courts' views of the weight such evidence should have take a variety
of forms and, unsurprisingly, rely on case specific facts. Even when courts
did not find that behavioral genetics evidence was likely to affect the out-
come of the case or was outweighed by aggravating factors, they still ad-
dressed and acknowledged family history. Particularly striking over the last
four years were arguments concerning defendants' genetic proclivities to
alcohol and substance abuse-a far larger percentage than had previously
been found.3"8 Again, regardless of whether such evidence positively affect-
ed the outcome of the defendant's sentence, courts did take it into account in
the same way they would other kinds of mitigating evidence. According to
the court in Rhoades v. Henry,3"9 for example, the evaluations of two experts
indicating that Rhoades likely has a genetic predisposition to serious disor-
ders were not sufficiently strong to shed light on Rhoades's mental and
emotional states of mind at the time he committed the murders.32° One ex-
pert stated that alcoholism and suicides in Rhoades's family "very likely"
indicated a genetic factor in his mental health.32' Another expert concluded
that Rhoades "inherited the diseases of alcoholism and drug abuse" and that
he was "born into a family that suffered from major mental illness and neu-
ropsychological impairment." '322 Yet the court viewed the reports of both
experts to be "speculative" and "indeterminate," concluding that the aggra-
vating factors in Rhoades's case outweighed the mitigating factors.323 The
district court and the Ninth Circuit also considered the reports of the experts
317. See infra Subsection 1I1.A.2.
318. See supra Section II.C.
319. 638 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2011).
320. Id. at 1050, 1052.
321. Id. at 1048.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 1050-51.
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in their analysis of Rhoades's claim, and both courts viewed the information
in the same way.324 As such evidence becomes more sophisticated, the ana-
lytical tilt may change.
These kinds of balances are perhaps most intricately assessed in cases
(previously discussed) where defendants have a proclivity for criminal con-
duct in unsympathetic circumstances. In Creech v. Hardison,325 for example,
the defendant, while serving a life sentence for murder, murdered another
prisoner by hitting him with a battery-filled sock and stomping on his head
and neck.326 The state court considered both aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors, such as the defendant's young age (mitigating), genetic or biological
predisposition for violence (mitigating), and the nature of the crime (highly
aggravating)-holding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigat-
ing factors,327 a conclusion the district court endorsed. 8 The court found
that the sentence would have been the same even with (among other factors)
the "possibility of a biological predisposition ... listed as a mitigating fac-
tor." '329 Likewise, in Schurz v. Schriro,33° the defendant-facing the death
sentence for murder after splashing the victim with gasoline and setting him
on fire-claimed on appeal that several mitigation factors should have been
presented at his sentencing hearing.' These mitigators included a genetic
predisposition toward addiction and mental illness, exposure to neurotoxins,
as well as a family life of violence and crime.332 The Schurz court acknowl-
edged all these influences;333 yet, it concluded, like the court in Creech, that
the defendant did not show these factors affected his ability to control, com-
prehend, or perceive his actions at the time of the murder and that the out-
come in the sentencing court would have been the same.334 The court in
Brant v. State35 similarly affirmed the defendant's death sentence, uncon-
vinced that the mitigating evidence (genetic predisposition to sexual sadism,
unhealthy childhood environment, family history of depression, and drug
use) outweighed the aggravating evidence (premeditation and attempts to
cover up the crime, and calm demeanor after the crime).336 Brant's impair-
324. Id. at 1050.
325. No. CV 99-0224-S-BLW, 2010 WL 1338126 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2010).
326. Id. at*1.
327. Id. at *3.
328. Id. at *10.
329. Id. at *It.
330. No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC, 2007 WL 2808220 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007).
331. Id. at*l1-2.
332. Id. at *43.
333. Id. at *48-49.
334. Id.
335. 21 So. 3d 1276 (Fla. 2009).
336. Id. at. 1286.
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ment due to abnormal brain functioning and drug use, while mitigating, was
"not so mitigating as to make his death sentence disproportionate." '337
Even in cases where defendants' propensities for violence are not as
marked, many courts remain unpersuaded by behavioral genetics evidence
of substance abuse. Yet, again, the important point here is that the courts
accept the validity of the evidence irrespective of whether it affects their
decision about the sentence. In Keough v. State,338 for example, the defend-
ant introduced evidence at his post-conviction hearing regarding a family
history of alcoholism.339 However, the defendant's convictions and death
sentence were affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals on the basis that
further investigation into his chronic alcoholism would have done little to
change the outcome of the case; the jury had already heard testimony about
the defendant's alcohol use on the night of the murder and had already re-
jected a defense theory of voluntary intoxication.34° In Commonwealth v.
Gibson34" ' the court similarly concluded that the new mitigation evidence
presented by the defendant, which included a family history of alcohol
abuse spanning at least three generations, was not reasonably likely to have
swayed a juror to alter his or her vote. 42 Thus, the court denied the defend-
ant's petition for post-conviction relief.343
Other courts in the last four years have tended to give behavioral ge-
netics evidence (including alcohol or substance abuse) more weight-some
to the point of considering it an error not to have a pretrial hearing on a de-
fendant's genetic predisposition; others have made it grounds for vacating a
death sentence. In Hawkins v. Wong,3" for instance, the court allowed an
evidentiary hearing on the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim,345 part of which concerned the failure to investigate and present miti-
gating evidence, including the defendant's genetic predisposition to alcohol-
ism and mental illness.346 According to the defendant, the mitigating evi-
dence omitted by counsel would have shown that the defendant was born
"into a family marked by extreme pathology and dysfunction over multiple
generations." '347 In Morales v. Mitchell,348 the court conclusively held that
337. Id. at 1287.
338. No. W2008-01916-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL 2612937 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30,
2010).
339. Id. at*13.
340. Id. at *23.
341. 19 A.3d 512 (Pa. 2011).
342. Id. at519,531.
343. Id. at 531.
344. No. CIV S-96-1155 MCE EFB DP, 2010 WL 3516399 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2,2010).
345. Id. at *86, *92.
346. Id. at *89.
347. Id.
348. 507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2007).
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defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to conduct an
investigation into mitigating evidence-information that primarily consisted
of alcoholism in Morales's family, Morales's own alcoholism and its effects
on him, as well as his family upbringing.349 The district court in Allison v.
Cullen350 also vacated the defendant's death sentence and granted relief on
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for his counsel's failure to
present mitigating evidence."' This evidence included expert statements that
the defendant might have a genetic predisposition to alcoholism, substance
abuse, and mental illness.352 Lastly, in Hall v. McPherson,353 the Supreme
Court of Georgia upheld the habeas court's vacation of McPherson's death
sentence. According to the court, the defendant's trial counsel should have
investigated further into McPherson's background, which included a family
tree showing a genetic predisposition to substance abuse disorder; failure to
do so was due to inattention, rather than to a strategic decision. 54
B. Is Behavioral Genetics Evidence Effective?
One way to try to measure the potential effectiveness of behavioral
genetics evidence in criminal cases is to provide a thorough sense of how
the evidence is being used. In most of the thirty-three cases in this Author's
Study, at least one of the defendants' claims alleged ineffective assistance
of counsel for counsel's failure to adequately investigate or present mitigat-
ing evidence of behavioral genetic factors.355 Morales v. Mitchell56 is one
349. Id. at931,936.
350. No. CV 92-06404 CAS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957 (C.D. Cal. July 22,
2010).
351. Id. at *120-21, *177.
352. Id. at *133, *169.
353. 663 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. 2008).
354. Id. at 662, 667, 670.
355. See Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 9177 931 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate the impact of defendant's cultur-
al background as well as the cause of defendant's mental and emotional deficiencies during
his lifelong alcohol consumption); Hawkins v. Wong, No. CIV S-96-1155 MCE EFB DP,
2010 WL 3516399, at *86, *89 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010) (concluding that counsel failed to
organize the case around themes supported by the mitigating evidence, and failed to investi-
gate and present mitigating evidence that defendant was genetically predisposed to alcohol-
ism and mental illness); Turner v. Epps, No. 4:07CV77-WAP, 2010 WL 653880, at *10-13
(N.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2010) (claiming that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or
present evidence of defendant's traumatic childhood upbringing, his depressive disorders, a
family history of mental illness, and a genetic predisposition to mental illness); Woodall v.
Simpson, No. 5:06CV-P216-R, 2009 WL 464939, at *45, *48-49 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2009)
(contending that counsel was ineffective for failing to present a genetic defect defense, to
obtain additional neurological testing for defendant, and to link defendant's mental condition
to his genetic history).
356. 507 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2007).
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case where counsel's failure to present this evidence was on strong ground.
Morales was a Native American man with a family history of alcoholism.3"7
During the penalty phase of his case, the only evidence presented was the
defendant's unsworn statement. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that
counsel's failure to present any mitigation evidence constituted deficient
performance.358 Among the points that the court agreed should have been
raised by trial counsel during the penalty phase was the defendant's "chaotic
and dysfunctional family environment" and "[t]he role of alcohol in the
Native American Indian culture" in which the defendant lived." 9 The court
found persuasive the "volume and compelling nature" of the evidence of
Morales's "tumultuous life, continued and uncontrolled alcohol and drug
abuse, dysfunctional family history, potential mental health problems, and
detailed cultural background"; thus, there was a "reasonable probability that
effective counsel could have achieved a different outcome. 36 °
In Hamilton v. Ayers,36' the Ninth Circuit also seemed to suggest that
counsel's failure to include behavioral genetics evidence was an influential
argument for claiming ineffective assistance. 362 Hamilton was facing the
death penalty and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus based on his claim
that he was incompetent to stand trial and that his counsel had not thorough-
ly investigated his mental state. 63 The district court rejected Hamilton's
petition despite expert testimony that Hamilton had a family history of ge-
netic disorders and a traumatic upbringing.3 " In a 2009 appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, the court remanded the case, with instructions to reduce Hamilton's
death sentence to life imprisonment without parole.3 65 The court found that
Hamilton's counsel was deficient for failing to investigate and present miti-
gating evidence, such as documentation of Hamilton's mental health histo-
ry.3 66 Among the mitigation information that should have been submitted
was a family history of depression and mental health issues, including indi-
cations that Hamilton's parents and extended family suffered from depres-
sion and suicidal thoughts, and his paternal great-grandmother and cousin
committed suicide.367 In addition, one expert who testified at Hamilton's
habeas hearing stated that Hamilton "was raised in an environment of inter-
357. Id. at 924, 931-33.
358. Id. at 933, 936.
359. Id. at931.
360. Id. at 935.
361. 583 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2009).
362. Id. at 1126-29.
363. Id. at 1102.
364. Id. at 1105.
365. Id. at 1136.
366. Id. at 1135-36.
367. Id. at 1127-28.
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generational alcoholism." '368 Given the new evidence, the court concluded
that Hamilton's trial counsel's investigation "fell far below the constitution-
al floor" and was prejudicial.369
Success in this arena depends on a wide range of factors. In other re-
cent appeals, courts have not given behavioral genetics evidence as much
weight. In 2010, the same court of appeals that vacated Hamilton's death
sentence, affirmed a denial of habeas for another defendant's guilt phase
and reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief as to the penalty
phase.37° In Mickey v. Ayers,3"' the district court agreed that the defendant's
counsel could have made a successful mitigation case with evidence that the
defendant's genetic propensities, when combined with his family upbring-
ing and mental illness, caused him to be predisposed to alcohol and drug
dependency.372 On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit found that the second
penalty phase expert's research into genetic links of certain diseases was in
a nascent stage at the time of trial; therefore, the defendant's counsel was
not deficient in failing to provide the expert with the defendant's family
history of substance abuse.373
In general, both of this Author's studies show that, as would be ex-
pected, counsel's failure to present behavioral genetics evidence alone was
often not enough to constitute ineffective assistance. But, when coupled
with other factors, courts were less reluctant to grant evidentiary hearings or
to vacate death sentences altogether for ineffective assistance.
C. Are There New Trends or Arguments?
This Article reports a number of new trends and arguments since
2007. The first trend concerns the changed role of behavioral genetics evi-
dence in criminal cases. n this Author's original study of forty-eight cases,
most cases employed behavioral genetics evidence in three primary ways:
(1) to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) to provide
proof and diagnosis of a defendant's mitigating condition, and/or (3) to in-
dicate some likelihood of the defendant's future dangerousness.374 This Au-
thor's most recent study of thirty-three cases showed, however, that there
was no third category and that no case applied behavioral genetics evidence
to predict the defendant's dangerousness.375 Nor was the evidence ever used
368. Id. at 1128.
369. Id. at 1129-31.
370. Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1249 (9th Cir. 2010).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1240.
373. Id. at 1247.
374. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
375. See infra Chart 2.
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by the prosecution, much less as an aggravating factor.3 76 While this Au-
thor's original study did not report many cases in which the evidence was
implemented detrimentally, the discovery that it has never been so used in
the last four years is startling. After all, this finding contradicts the Supreme
Court's view in Landrigan that such evidence could be submitted to en-
hance the perception of a defendant's level of dangerousness.377
Second, in light of the Court's 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia,378
behavioral genetics evidence now may play a larger role in defendants
claiming a genetic predisposition to mental retardation3 79 and mental incom-
petence. 8° In Ex parte Smith,"' for example, Smith tried to argue that he
was mentally retarded and not eligible for the death penalty.382 Smith stated
that he had a genetic predisposition to mental retardation and that five of his
family members suffered from the same mental infirmity.383 However, in an
Atkins hearing, the court determined that Smith was not mentally retarded
because he had failed to demonstrate substantial or significant deficits in
adaptive behavior, either at the time of the murders or before the hearing.3"
There was a different outcome in Commonwealth v. Williams.385 In Wil-
liams, the issue also was whether the defendant was mentally retarded and
therefore ineligible for the death penalty. An expert stated that the defendant
was born with "some genetic predisposition to mental retardation," and he
had closed-head injuries as a child due to abuse. 86 The court evaluated the
expert opinions and determined that Williams was mentally retarded and
therefore ineligible for the death penalty.387
In Morris v. Ma/fi,388 the defendant claimed that his due process rights
were violated because he was tried and adjudicated while mentally incom-
petent."9 During the penalty phase of his trial, Morris submitted evidence of
376. See supra notes 192-93, 201 and accompanying text.
377. Schiro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 480-81 (2007).
378. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
379. See Hall v. Quarterman, No. 4:06-CV-436-A, 2009 WL 612559, at *33, *40
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2009); Exparle Smith, No. 1080973, 2010 WL 4148528, at *4 (Ala. Oct.
22, 2010); Commonwealth v. Williams, Nos. 200001876, 200002869, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.
Dec. LEXIS 193, at *6 (Pa. D. & C. May 13, 2010).
380. See Morris v. Malfi, No. C 06-7409 SI, 2010 WL 2629738, *11, *16 (N.D. Cal.
June 29, 2010), aff'd, 449 F. App'x 686 (9th Cir. 2011).
381. No. 1080973, 2010 WL 4148528 (Ala. Oct. 22, 2010).
382. Id. at*l.
383. Id. at *4.
384. Id. at *7.
385. 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at *3.
386. Id. at *6.
387. Id. at*13-14.
388. No. C 06-7409 S1, 2010 WL 2629738 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010), affd, 449 F.
App'x 686 (9th Cir. 2011).
389. Id. at*10.
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head injuries, including two in the frontal part of his brain, the area that
controls emotions, impulses, and inhibition of behavior.3 Morris also sub-
mitted a 2009 evaluation and report by Dr. Natasha Khazanov, a clinical
psychologist. 9 ' Dr. Khazanov reviewed and evaluated psychological and
medical records pertaining to Morris's head traumas, criminal cases, and
family medical and psychiatric history, as well as conducted neuropsycho-
logical testing on him.392 In her report, Dr. Khazanov stated, among other
things, that Morris had a genetic predisposition to chronic psychopathology,
specifically paranoid schizophrenia.393
As this Article previously mentioned, the Author's 2007-2011 Study
also revealed more cases in which courts incorporated behavioral genetics
evidence to support defendants' claims of the inheritance of alcohol and
drug dependency.394 This trend was particularly pronounced relative to other
kinds of factors. Regardless, as these results make clear, courts seemingly
no longer view any type of scientifically accepted behavioral genetics evi-
dence as "exotic" in the same way that Landrigan did.395 Nor is there any
overt indication that behavioral genetics evidence has reinforced concerns
expressed in the context of Mobley, most particularly worries that actors in
the criminal justice system would increasingly and irresponsibly rely on
distorted information in their decision making.396
Indeed, as this Author has previously contended,3 97 concerns over be-
havioral genetics evidence in criminal cases can be a red herring, deflecting
attention from the realization that courts can genetically stereotype defend-
ants irrespective of any attempt made by those defendants to submit genet-
ics arguments. While no such case was found in this Author's most recent
Study, the Author did find such a case in the prior study. In State v.
Madey,398 the defendant, who pled guilty to misdemeanor assault after two
police officers tried to take her into protective custody for public intoxica-
tion,399 challenged the court's probation requirements, one of which mandat-
ed that she write an essay on "alcoholism and the American Indians."'  The
requirements were also made in the context of the court's numerous and
unsubstantiated comments about Madey's ethnic proclivity for alcohol-
390. Id. at *5.
391. Id. at *9.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. See supra Subsection l.B.
395. Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 2001).
396. See supra notes 301-15 and accompanying text.
397. See Behavioral Genetics Evidence, supra note 19, at 348.
398. No. 81166, 2002 WL 31429827 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2002) (vacating and
remanding sentencing decision of the trial court).
399. Id. at *1.
400. Id. at *2.
1019
Michigan State Law Review
ism.4' These comments included asking Madey's mother whether "she
knew 'anything about genetic predisposition to alcoholism?"' or "if she had
'ever been on an Indian Reservation?' and if she had ever seen 'the Scotch
or Irish drinking?' 4 °2 The court even asked the mother whether she "had a
concern that her daughter would become 'a flaming alcoholic' because, with
such an ethnic background, 'there [was] nothing she can do about it.""'4 3 In
turn, the court continually speculated about the degree of the defendant's
future dangerousness, even characterizing the defendant's potential state of
being a murder victim as a danger to others: "[1]f you start drinking like
this, you're a danger. You will go out and get yourself attacked, or mur-
dered, or something,.., and every time somebody is killed or raped in soci-
ety, that diminishes the public safety overall."4" In vacating the defendant's
sentence and remanding, the appellate court noted that not only were the
trial court's comments completely unrelated "to an interest in doing justice,"
but that the defendant did not "attempt[] to use her family background to
excuse her behavior. '405
In Madey, the genetic stereotyping was in the court's eyes only, a po-
tential cause for concern in any case, no matter the defense or evidentiary
circumstances. Yet some courts have not needed a cultural stereotype to use
genetics wrongly. In 2011, for example, a three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned a federal district
court's decision to sentence a defendant to six-and-a-half years in a child
pornography case because the court had made inappropriate conclusions
about genetic proclivities.4 6 In the district court's eyes, the defendant would
recidivate and continue viewing child pornography "because of an as-of-yet
undiscovered gene."4 7 Such a marker is "'a gene you were born with,"' the
court stated to the defendant, "'[a]nd it's not a gene you can get rid of."' 48
Rejecting as "'virtually worthless"' the two psychological evaluations that
demonstrated the defendant was "at a low to moderate risk to re-offend," the
court reiterated to the defendant a genetic prediction:' "'You are what
you're born with. And that's the only explanation for what I see here." ''4 0




404. Id. at *2.
405. Id. at *4.
406. See U.S. v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2011) ("The judgment of the
district court hereby is VACATED and REMANDED for resentencing consistent with this
opinion, with instructions to assign the case to a different judge.").
407. Id. at 88.
408. Id. at 87 (citations omitted).
409. Id. (citations omitted).
410. Id. (citations omitted)
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theory of genetics,"4" I emphasizing the district court's lack of fairness and
integrity and ordering the defendant to be sentenced by a different judge.4 12
Such cases emphasize all the more the enhanced need for a measured judi-
ciary.
D. The Potential Impact of Cullen v. Pinholster
After Schriro v. Landrigan,1 3 Cullen v. Pinholster4 4 is the only Su-
preme Court case that has addressed behavioral genetics evidence." 5 Yet,
unlike Landrigan, Pinholster does not focus so much on the type of evi-
dence at issue, but rather on how and when such evidence can be evaluat-
411. Id. at 88.
412. Id. at 89.
413. 550 U.S. 465 (2007).
414. 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
415. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1388, had a long and complex procedural history before
it reached the Supreme Court. On automatic appeal after Scott Lynn Pinholster was convict-
ed of murder and sentenced to death, the Supreme Court of California set aside a redundant
"multiple-murder special circumstances" charge and affirmed the conviction otherwise.
People v. Pinholster, 824 P.2d 571, 617-18 (1992). Pinholster sought two writs of habeas
corpus in state court, alleging that his trial counsel (1) failed to adequately investigate and
present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase, and (2) did not give all relevant mate-
rials to a psychiatrist who diagnosed Pinholster with only a personality disorder at trial. See
Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that the second state court
writ containing the second claim was filed after the federal court found it to be an unexhaust-
ed claim in a federal habeas corpus petition). The California Supreme Court summarily de-
nied both petitions and Pinholster subsequently filed a federal habeas petition with the same
two claims and requesting an evidentiary hearing. See Id. The district court granted habeas
relief on Pinholster's death sentence, denied an evidentiary hearing on the guilt phase inef-
fective assistance claim, and granted an evidentiary hearing on the penalty phase claim.
Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 660 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant
of habeas relief and affirmed the hearing, Pinholster v. Ayers, 525 F.3d at 748-49, 773, but
then vacated the opinion and affirmed the grant of habeas relief on a rehearing en banc,
Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d at 655. The Ninth Circuit found that defense counsel's failure
to investigate the defendant's background for mitigating evidence to present during the pen-
alty phase was deficient and prejudicial to Pinholster's defense. The court then held that, as a
result, the California Supreme Court's summary denial of relief contravened Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d at 675-85. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the grant of habeas corpus.
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1411 (2011). Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of
the Court, joined in full by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy. Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Kagan joined only Part II of the majority opinion. Id at 1394. Justice
Alito joined all but Part 11. See id. at 1411-12 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). Justice Breyer joined Parts I and II. See id. at 1412-13 (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Sotomayor dissented, and Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Kagan joined Part H of her dissenting opinion. See id. at 1413-36 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
For a recent discussion of Pinholster, see Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53
B.C. L. REV. 1 (2012).
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ed.4 6 It is seemingly irrelevant that the evidence happened to include behav-
ioral genetics factors. Thus, while Pinholster is a significant and complicat-
ed case, this Section's overview is confined specifically to the issues at
hand.
Pinholster is pertinent to this Article's discussion for two reasons.
First, the case's complex procedural history is an all-too-classic example of
a prisoner's extraordinary challenges with an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim.4"7 Second, the Pinholster Court's holding could substantially im-
pact currently-pending behavioral genetics cases (including those examined
in this Article), as well as future cases involving behavioral genetics evi-
dence.4t8 Before Pinholster, for example, federal habeas courts could hold
hearings and evaluate new evidence when they reviewed how state courts
construed federal law under AEDPA.4"9 State prisoners who had been una-
ble to adequately present their claims in state court could seek habeas relief
in federal court.4"' As a result of Pinholster, however, such federal review
has been severely limited, thus hindering state prisoners' efforts to garner
federal habeas relief.421 As Professor Samuel Wiseman has shown,
Pinholster substantially changes the foundation in which federal courts can
review state records in habeas cases, thereby magnifying the need for pris-
oners to adequately develop their records and claims in state court.422
Petitioners have begun to create strategies to circumvent Pinholster;
yet it remains unclear how effective these strategies will be.423 To provide
context for such modifications, the next part of this Section examines the
procedural history and evidence that frames Pinholster. The discussion then
considers how Pinholster may affect currently pending and future behavior-
al genetics evidence cases.
1. History and Evidence
In 1984, Scott Lynn Pinholster was convicted in state court of mur-
der.424 After accepting and rejecting several attorneys and even representing
himself at one point, Pinholster later reconsidered and accepted the two
416. See infra Subsection I1I.D.2.
417. See supra note 415 & infra Subsection 1IID. 1.
418. See infra Subsection 111.D.2.
419. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code). For an overview of practices before Pinholster, see Wiseman,
supra note 415, at 6-11.
420. See Wiseman, supra note 415, at 2-3, 6-11.
421. Id. at 11-25.
422. Id. at 11-53.
423. Id. at 25-53.
424. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1288, 1395-96 (2011).
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attorneys the court appointed.425 In a hasty effort to prepare Pinholster's
mitigation case,426 Pinholster's counsel consulted with an expert whose con-
clusions were not in Pinholster's favor. According to the expert, Pinholster
"did not manifest any significant signs or symptoms of mental disorder or
defect other than his antisocial personality disorder by history. 4 27 In addi-
tion, the expert considered Pinholster "cognitively functional, without brain
damage. 412 Pinholster's counsel did not contact the expert again, nor any
other expert.42 9 Indeed, Pinholster's attorneys billed a total of 6.5 hours in
preparation for the penalty phase;43° Pinholster's mother was the only de-
fense witness at the proceeding.43'
After the jury sentenced Pinholster to death,432 Pinholster twice sought
habeas relief in the California Supreme Court. 33 He alleged that his trial
counsel had failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence
during the penalty phase.434 In an effort to bolster his claim, Pinholster in-
troduced additional evidence: school, medical, and legal records; as well as
declarations from family members, one of his trial attorneys, and a psychia-
trist. 3 While arguing to the state court that his counsel performed deficient-
ly, Pinholster also contended that his attorneys should have pursued and
presented information about the following three matters: Pinholster's family
members and their criminal, mental, and substance abuse problems;
Pinholster's schooling; and Pinholster's medical and mental health history,
including his epileptic disorder.436 The California Supreme Court summarily
denied relief.437 Pinholster subsequently filed a habeas petition claiming that
his counsel should have provided one of his key experts, Dr. John M.
Stalberg, with his family history, particularly as related to mental disorders;
as a result, Dr. Stalberg "would have made further inquiry 'before conclud-
ing that [Pinholster] had merely a personality disorder."438 The district court
held Pinholster's petition in abeyance, and the California Supreme Court
ultimately denied his second habeas petition because it lacked merit.439
425. Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 657 (9th Cir. 2009) (rev'dsubnom. Cullen v.




429. Id. at 658.
430. Id.
431. Id.




436. Id. at 659-60.
437. Id. at 663.
438. Id. at 659-60 (quoting John M. Stalberg, M.D., expert testifying physician).
439. Id. at 660.
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After the case was sent back to federal court, Pinholster next requested
an evidentiary hearing, which, while denied for the guilt phase, was granted
for the penalty phase." This time, Pinholster had two experts present new
mitigation evidence, including testimony that his childhood was much
worse than his mother had described." The revelations about Pinholster's
family were striking: his biological father was a drunk, "had mood swings
and fits of anger, and was eventually diagnosed as paranoid with narcissistic
personality disorder.""' 2 Pinholster's older brother Alvin, while charged
with the rape and sodomy of a young teen, was found incompetent to stand
trial and diagnosed with schizophrenia."3 Alvin later committed suicide."4
Pinholster's other siblings were similarly troubled. His younger brother
Terry evidenced mild depression and heavily used drugs."5 His half-sister
Tammy, by age eleven, began abusing alcohol"6 and, by age seventeen, was
arrested with her boyfriend for the sexual assault of a young teenage girl."7
Pinholster's half-brother Guy evidenced manic depression, and another half-
brother Gary was characterized as "an alcoholic with severe mood
swings. '
Pinholster's own disorders fit the family pattern but also indicated that
accidents and injuries appeared to be part of the source. According to
Pinholster's experts, for example, Pinholster "had suffered brain damage
that explained his aggressive, impulsive, and antisocial behavior." ' 9 One of
the experts, a pediatric neurologist, also testified that Pinholster "sustained
frontal-lobe injuries" as a result of two car accidents, occurring during
childhood. This expert derived this conclusion from two findings:
Pinholster's diagnosis of epilepsy and documentation that, at age nine, he
had an abnormal electroencephalogram (EEG)."'
According to the Ninth Circuit, all of this evidence demonstrated that
Pinholster's trial counsel were ineffective in complying with Strickland v.
Washington.5' Indeed, the court stressed the paucity of counsel's billing
records, which "confirm counsel's own admissions that they spent almost












451. Id. at 671 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
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whether Pinholster would live or die. 452 Thus, the court set forth two con-
clusions in accordance with Strickland. First, Pinholster's counsel were "de-
ficient" for neglecting to research Pinholster's history so that they could
provide mitigating evidence during the penalty phase." 3 Second, such defi-
ciency "prejudiced the defense," thereby rendering the California Supreme
Court's denial of relief on ineffective assistance as a contravention of
Strickland.4"4
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari455 was followed by an opin-
ion456 which, while not directed at Pinholster's behavioral genetics evidence,
surely would have some bearing on how such evidence could be considered
for future inmates. Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas took a
different stance, for example, on how to interpret trial counsel's billing rec-
ords, stressing that the records showed that Pinholster's counsel had indeed
investigated mitigating evidence.457 In reversing the Ninth Circuit, Justice
Thomas explained that "Itihere [was] no reasonable probability that the
additional evidence presented at Pinholster's state proceedings would have
changed the verdict." '458 Not only would the supplementary information have
"largely duplicated the mitigation evidence of [Pinholster's] mother and
brother at trial," but any new documentation that may have been offered "is
of questionable mitigating value." '459 Although Justice Thomas did not ad-
dress Pinholster's genetic evidence specifically, the prior opinion,
Pinholster v. Ayers,46 did discuss the records Pinholster sought to intro-
duce.461
Yet, despite the fact that behavioral genetics information was present-
ed as part of the mitigating evidence at issue in the Pinholster Court's re-
view, the Court's holding is not based on the genetic nature of the evidence.
At the same time, Pinholster has already had an impact on behavioral genet-
ics evidence cases, and it can be expected to have further influence.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 664, 671.
454. Id. at 664, 674, 684.
455. Cullen v. Pinholster, 130 S. Ct. 3410 (2010).
456. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). For an overview of the splintered
dimensions of the case and how the Justices voted see supra note 415.
457. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
458. Id. at 1393.
459. Id.
460. 590 F.3d 651, 657 (9th Cir. 2009) (rev'dsubnom. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.
Ct. 1388 (2011)).
461. Id. at 657-61.
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2. Behavioral Genetics Cases
Behavioral genetics evidence is often not introduced until post-
conviction proceedings, and the cases using it frequently involve ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.4 62 Therefore, Pinholster could have a consider-
able impact on currently-pending behavioral genetics cases.
Two petitioners in this Article's survey have already had their cases
remanded in light of Pinholster.4 63 In each of the cases, the failure to ade-
quately investigate or present behavioral genetics evidence (along with oth-
er factors) was grounds for vacating a death sentence and remanding for
imposition of a sentence of life in prison." At the present time, it is unclear
whether these petitioners' death sentences will remain vacated. Since
Pinholster was decided, lower courts have been more reluctant to grant evi-
dentiary hearings;4 65 the decision places a greater burden on a petitioner to
adequately develop the factual record in state court, making it uncertain
whether federal courts will be permitted to fill the gap in situations where a
petitioner is unable to do so.4 66 As Professor Wiseman explains, "Without
the safeguard of federal fact development under [AEDPA], cases of egre-
gious unfairness in state post-conviction procedures will demand new solu-
tions."'' 7
The cases following Pinholster suggest that petitioners seeking habeas
relief in the federal courts, particularly those who have claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, will face higher hurdles. Pinholster makes clear that
federal courts should be basing their determination on whether to grant ha-
beas relief solely on evidence found within the state record.16' This situation
poses a considerable barrier for petitioners whose grounds for relief are
rooted in the inadequacy or absence of certain evidence in state proceed-
ings. In seven of the cases in this Article's Study in which the petitioner's
death sentence was vacated or an evidentiary hearing was upheld, the deci-
sion was based precisely on the failure to adequately investigate or present
behavioral genetics evidence in state court.69 It is unclear whether the same
results would follow had these cases been decided after Pinholster7 °
462. See supra Subsection II.A.
463. See Ryan v. Detrich, 131 S. Ct. 2449 (2011); Ryan v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 2091
(2011).
464. Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2449 (2011);
Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2091 (2011).
465. See Wiseman, supra note 415, at 16-20.
466. See id at 54-55.
467. Id. at 54.
468. See id at 1-6.
469. See Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038, 1065, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated,
131 S. Ct. 2449 (2011); Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v.
Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 643, 647 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2091 (2011); Morales v.
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Pinholster, of course, did not mandate that courts take a less favorable
approach to behavioral genetics evidence specifically. At the same time,
reaction to the Court's holding indicates that cases seeking appellate relief
on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, a category into which
behavioral genetics cases have typically fallen, may receive cooler reception
in the federal courts. This potential outcome may have implications for the
likelihood of success of behavioral genetics cases in general irrespective of
any actual change in courts' views of genetics evidence. Indeed, a change in
standards to one of greater deference to state and attorney determinations
might pose additional problems for petitioners seeking to introduce new
facts to the record.
One way for a petitioner to avoid the hurdles created by Pinholster
would be to convince the court that the petitioner's claims were not "adjudi-
cated on the merits" in state proceedings. The future success rate of these
claims may be an indicator of whether new evidence remains a key compo-
nent in obtaining federal habeas relief on two levels-in the context of be-
havioral genetics evidence and also in the broader sense of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims in habeas proceedings.
CONCLUSION
For decades, the link between behavioral genetics and criminality has
been haunted with controversy, raising questions about how such evidence
is, or should be, applied. This Article tackles those questions by analyzing a
unique study of all criminal cases (totaling thirty-three) that addressed
behavioral genetics evidence from June 1, 2007, to July 1, 2011. The Study
builds upon this Author's prior research on all criminal cases (totaling forty-
eight) that used such evidence during the preceding thirteen years (1994-
2007). This combined collection of eighty-one criminal cases employing
behavioral genetics evidence offers a rich context for determining how the
criminal justice system has been handling genetics factors for nearly two
decades, but also why the last four years reveal particularly important
discoveries. Results suggest that not only is much of the controversy
surrounding behavioral genetics and crime unwarranted, the use of such
evidence has been misunderstood.
Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916, 942 (6th Cir. 2007); Allison v. Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 924, 925
(C.D. Cal. 2010); Hall v. McPherson, 663 S.E.2d 659, 664 (Ga. 2008); Commonwealth v.
Williams, Nos. 200001876, 200002869, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at *15 (Pa.
D. & C. May 13, 2010); see also supra note 185 and accompanying text (describing the
circumstances of these seven cases).
470. In an effort to address the uncertainty, Professor Wiseman suggests that defend-
ants will search for ways to get around Pinholster. See Wiseman, supra note 415, at 25-53.
For this Article's purposes, however, examining such alternatives waits for another day.
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Within the last four years, for example, behavioral genetics evidence
has appeared to have been applied almost exclusively as mitigating
evidence in death penalty cases and primarily in two ways--4o support
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for neglecting such evidence or
to provide proof and diagnosis of a defendant's mitigating condition.
Strikingly, this Study found no case during 2007-2011 in which behavioral
genetics factors were introduced by the State, much less used as aggravating
evidence or as indications that a defendant would be a future danger to
others. These findings debunk arguments that such evidence will be legally
detrimental to a defendant. Indeed, in most cases, the evidence is so tightly
intertwined with other factors in a defendant's life that the particular impact
of behavioral genetics can be difficult to isolate. This Study's results
suggest that, at the very least, behavioral genetics evidence has no
decipherable impact on a defendant's case or, at most, it becomes an
effective tool along with a range of other kinds of variables in rendering a
defendant ineligible for the death penalty. Courts appear willing to accept
behavioral genetics evidence as part of a defendant's mitigation story, even
if genetics renders that story a more troubling one in terms of the
defendant's purported propensities. The last four years also showed a
number of break-a-way trends from earlier years. For example, there were
substantially more cases that incorporated behavioral genetics evidence of
any kind. In addition, there was a clear increase in the number of cases in
which defendants submitted proof of a genetic propensity for alcoholism
and/or substance abuse.
Overall, this Article's research shows that courts accept behavioral
genetics evidence in the majority of cases in which defense attorneys
attempt to offer it. In contrast to past years when courts at times questioned
the applicability or relevance of such information, recent findings indicate
that their focus has turned elsewhere. In particular, courts emphasize the
importance of determining whether the evidence, when used with other
factors in mitigation, can outweigh the aggravating factors that support a
death sentence. The coming years will reveal whether such trends will be
affected by Cullen v. Pinholster,47 the Supreme Court's recent decision
restricting prisoners' efforts to seek federal habeas relief under AEDPA.472
Regardless, behavioral genetics evidence seems, on the surface, to have
reached a status commensurate with other kinds of evidence without the
baggage of abuse with which it has typically been associated.
471. 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011).
472. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code).
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APPENDIX
CRIMINAL CASES REFERENCING BEHAVIORAL
GENETICS EVIDENCE:
JUNE 1, 2007 - JULY 1, 2011*
Year Cases
2006 Loving v. United States, 64 M.J. 132 (C.A.A.F. 2006), 68
M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 67 (2010).
Defendant was convicted of premeditated murder and sen-
tenced to death. He raised claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel for counsel's failure to investigate and present miti-
gating evidence of defendant's family history of alcohol and
substance abuse addiction, which could point to a genetic
predisposition. Remanding for an evidentiary hearing to de-
termine whether counsel closed the investigation premature-
ly, the court cited that defendant's traumatic family back-
ground and upbringing demonstrated sufficient cause to es-
tablish a basis for review. At the evidentiary hearing, testi-
mony was presented regarding defendant's family history of
drug use, as well as biopsychosocial assessment. Upon con-
clusion of the evidentiary hearing, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces found that the new evidence
was largely cumulative and that its exclusion was not preju-
dicial to defendant. The habeas relief petition was denied.
Hamilton v. Ayers, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2006),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 583 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2009).
Defendant, facing a murder conviction and death sentence,
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. Defendant claimed he
was incompetent to stand trial and that his counsel failed to
investigate his mental state. Defendant's expert witnesses
testified that defendant had a family history of genetic disor-
ders and a traumatic upbringing. The district court rejected
the petition, noting the absence of medical records document-
ing defendant's mental state, or any indication that defendant
* The three 2006 cases are included in this Article's study because, in addition to
their 2006 decisions, their subsequent case histories also made reference to behavioral genet-
ics evidence.
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behaved irrationally during the trial or failed to understand
the proceedings. The court held that defendant was compe-
tent to stand trial. On appeal in the Ninth Circuit, the court
held that counsel was in fact deficient for failing to investi-
gate and present mitigating evidence, such as evidence of
defendant's mental health history and extremely abusive
childhood. The court remanded the case to the superior court
with instructions to reduce the punishment to a life sentence
without possibility of parole.
Mickey v. Ayers, No. C-93-0243 RMW, 2006 WL 3358410
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 606
F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 419
(2011). Defendant, facing a murder conviction and death
sentence, claimed ineffective assistance of counsel at the
penalty phase of the trial, arguing that his counsel had failed
to utilize effectively the skill and knowledge of mental health
experts in presenting defendant's mitigation evidence. Ac-
cording to defendant, counsel could have made a successful
mitigation case that defendant's genetic propensities, when
combined with his family upbringing and mental illness,
caused him to be predisposed to alcohol and drug dependen-
cy. The district court agreed. On appeal, however, the Ninth
Circuit found that the additional mitigation evidence was
unreliable and that counsel had effectively utilized the input
of mental health experts at trial. The court further held that
counsel's failure to present this evidence was not prejudicial
because the prosecution would have rebutted with evidence
of defendant's sexually deviant behavior. With regard to ge-
netic evidence, the court found that the second penalty phase
expert's research into genetic links of certain diseases was in
a nascent stage at the time of trial. As a result, counsel was
not deficient in failing to provide the expert with defendant's
family history of substance abuse.
2007 Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2007), reh'g en
banc denied, Nos. 00-3694/3787, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
5909 (6th Cir. Mar. 10, 2008). Defendant faced the death
sentence for murder. Expert testimony was presented during
the trial phase that Native Americans have a genetic predis-
position for alcoholism, and defendant, a Native American,
was therefore predisposed to become alcoholic and intoxicat-
ed. On appeal, defendant claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel for counsel's failure to adequately investigate a va-
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riety of sources related to defendant's condition: his exten-
sive family history of alcoholism, his cultural background
and its effect on him, and a potential neurological cause of
his mental and emotional deficiencies due to lifelong alcohol
consumption. Counsel also neglected to hire a mitigation
expert. The court held that defendant's counsel was ineffec-
tive because counsel failed to conduct an investigation for
mitigating evidence. Such evidence included the following:
indications of alcoholism in defendant's family, defendant's
own alcoholism and its effects on him (he was prone to
blackouts), and defendant's upbringing (alcoholic, absent
parents and a mentally retarded, abusive brother).
Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sen-
tenced to death. At trial, a physician and addiction medicine
specialist testified about genetic predisposition to addiction
and depression, as well as the effects of methamphetamine on
the brain. The specialist also testified about the substantial
history of addiction and depression in defendant's family.
Defendant appealed his conviction on several issues, includ-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel. His case was remanded
for resentencing on a different issue.
Schurz v. Schriro, No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC, 2007 WL
2808220 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007). Defendant was found
guilty of first-degree murder and attempted aggravated rob-
bery. Defendant initiated habeas proceedings after his peti-
tions for post-conviction relief were denied. Among defend-
ant's claims was ineffective assistance of counsel for coun-
sel's failure to adequately investigate and present available
mitigation evidence. Defendant argued that evidence of fetal
alcohol syndrome, genetic predisposition to addiction and
mental illness, and extreme physical and verbal abuse in the
home should have been presented. The court found that this
evidence was not significantly different from the mitigating
evidence presented at trial. In addition, defendant had not
demonstrated how his dysfunctional background had any
effect on his ability to control, comprehend, or perceive his
actions at the time of the murder. Habeas relief was denied.
Wood v. Schriro, No. CV-98-053-TUC-JMR, 2007 WL
3124451 (D. Ariz. Oct. 24, 2007). Defendant was convicted
of first-degree murder and aggravated assault and sentenced
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to death. On appeal, defendant claimed that trial counsel had
rendered ineffective assistance for two reasons. First, counsel
had failed to sufficiently prepare a defense expert witness, a
neuropsychologist. Second, counsel neglected to investigate
and present mitigating evidence related to defendant's social
and medical background, including evidence of head injuries
and a family history of alcoholism. The court affirmed denial
of habeas relief, finding that counsel had actually developed
and presented such evidence in detail (counsel had even
sought appointment of a neurometric brain-mapping techni-
cian).
Berryman v. Ayers, No. 1:95-CV-05309-AWI, 2007 WL
1991049 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2007). Defendant was convicted
of rape and murder and sentenced to death. After numerous
appeals and petitions, defendant filed a request for an eviden-
tiary hearing on a number of claims, including ineffective
assistance of counsel. At trial, it was mentioned that defend-
ant suffered from some organic brain damage, had a family
history of alcoholism and substance abuse, and was genet-
ically predisposed to alcoholism and depression. A PET scan
of defendant's brain was introduced, suggesting evidence of
abnormal activity. Defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, and subsequently, his habeas corpus petition,
were denied. Since the time Berryman v. Ayers was decided,
defendant was granted a certificate of appealability on the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure
to uncover evidence of defendant's dysfunctional family his-
tory. See Berryman v. Wong, No. 1:95-CV-05309-AWI,
2010 WL 289181, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010).
2008 Hodges v. Bell, 548 F. Supp. 2d 485 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).
Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
One of defendant's claims on appeal was that the trial court
had denied him funding for an expert in the field of genetic
transmission of drug and alcohol dependency, in violation of
defendant's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
court upheld the trial court's denial of the expert services,
stating that counsel was capable of presenting to the court
information about the substance addictions, and the court was
able to process that information without the need for an ex-
pert. The court denied petitioner's habeas petition and dis-
missed his action with prejudice.
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Hall v. McPherson, 663 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. 2008). Defendant
was convicted of murder and theft and sentenced to death on
the murder charge. Defendant applied for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for coun-
sel's failure to present and investigate mitigating evidence.
This evidence, presented at the habeas hearing, included tes-
timony from a psychiatrist regarding defendant's family tree,
which indicated defendant's genetic predisposition to sub-
stance dependence disorder. The habeas court vacated de-
fendant's death sentence, and the warden appealed. On ap-
peal, the court upheld the habeas court's vacation.
Williams v. Norris, No. 5:07cv00234 SWW, 2008 WL
4820559 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 4, 2008), aff'd, 612 F.3d 941 (8th
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1677 (2011). Defendant
was serving a life sentence for murder, kidnapping, robbery,
theft, and arson when he escaped from prison and robbed and
killed another victim. Defendant was subsequently convicted
of capital felony murder and theft of a vehicle and sentenced
to death on the murder conviction. After his appeals and peti-
tions for post-conviction relief were denied, defendant filed
for habeas relief in federal court. There he asserted that coun-
sel was ineffective for failing to introduce supporting docu-
mentation of mitigating evidence, including evidence of gen-
erational family dysfunction. The court denied habeas relief,
finding that counsel presented a thorough and lengthy inves-
tigation of defendant's social, physical, educational, and fam-
ily history.
2009 Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276 (Fla. 2009). Defendant was
convicted of murder, sexual battery, burglary, kidnapping,
and grand theft of a motor vehicle. He was sentenced to death
on the murder charge. On appeal, defendant argued that his
death sentence was disproportionate. At defendant's trial, a
forensic psychiatrist testified that defendant suffered from
sexual sadism, a condition that normally arises from a com-
bination of a genetic predisposition to sexual sadism and an
unhealthy childhood environment. Defendant's mother also
testified to a family history of depression. A PET scan of
defendant's brain was produced at trial, indicating low activi-
ty in the areas governing impulse control and good judgment.
Defendant's death sentence was affirmed by the court, which
found that the mitigating evidence did not outweigh the ag-
gravating evidence.
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Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135 (Fla. 2009). Defendant was
convicted on two counts of murder and sentenced to death.
Although not an issue on appeal, during the trial, defendant
presented evidence from a psychiatrist who testified that de-
fendant had a genetic predisposition to alcohol and substance
abuse. The inheritance pattern and observation of violence
during defendant's youth made it twenty percent more likely
that defendant would have a behavioral problem or become a
criminal. The court reaffirmed defendant's death sentence.
Henry v. Ryan, No. CV 02-656-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL
692356 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2009). Defendant was convicted of
first-degree murder, robbery, kidnapping, and theft, and was
sentenced to death. In his third petition for post-conviction
relief, defendant argued that his resentencing counsel had
performed ineffectively by failing to obtain a complete life
history and present mitigating evidence regarding defendant's
mental health. A presentence investigation report noted de-
fendant's family history of schizophrenia and defendant's
own schizophrenic symptoms. Since the information had
been available at presentencing, the court denied relief.
Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 131 S.
Ct. 2091 (2011). Defendant was convicted on two counts of
murder and one count of attempted murder and sentenced to
death. Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief,
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because of coun-
sel's failure to do the following: hire a mental health expert,
move for neurological and neuropsychological testing, and
present additional mitigating witnesses and evidence. The
petition was denied, and defendant appealed. On appeal, one
of the mitigating factors considered by the court was defend-
ant's longstanding substance abuse problem that may have
been caused by genetic influences and further aggravated by
head trauma. The court agreed that defendant's counsel was
ineffective, reversed the district court's decision, and re-
manded with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus.
The U.S. Supreme Court later reversed and remanded the
case in Ryan v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 2091 (2011), in light of Cul-
len v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
Rienhardt v. Ryan, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (D. Ariz. 2009).
Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, attempted transfer of
a dangerous drug, attempted arson, and first-degree murder.
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He was sentenced to death on the murder charge. On appeal,
defendant argued that his counsel performed ineffectively at
sentencing in violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. In particular, counsel had
failed to conduct a mitigation investigation to advise defend-
ant on whether to present any mitigation evidence. The doc-
uments contained in defendant's presentence report included
such information as defendant's social history, childhood
details, education, family background, employment history,
and alcohol and drug abuse. The court found that defendant
failed to demonstrate prejudice.
Woodall v. Simpson, No. 5:06-CV-P216-R, 2009 WL
464939 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2009). Defendant was convicted
of kidnapping, rape, and murder, and sentenced to death.
Defendant then filed a writ of habeas corpus to the district
court, citing thirty errors, multiple of which were based on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Part of this claim
alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to present a
genetic defect defense, and neglecting to link defendant's
mental state to his genetic history. The court held on this
claim that the jury could have inferred that defendant's fami-
ly had a genetic history of mental problems. However, the
court found that two other claims made by defendant war-
ranted relief, and granted habeas on these claims. Defend-
ant's sentence was vacated and remanded to state trial court.
Hall v. Quarterman, No. 4:06-CV-436-A, 2009 WL 612559
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2009). Defendant was convicted of capital
murder and sentenced to death. Following a series of appeals,
the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision and remanded the case for reconsideration
in light of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In defend-
ant's habeas action, the trial court ordered a hearing by way
of affidavits on the issue of defendant's mental retardation.
On the basis of this hearing, the court concluded that defend-
ant was not mentally retarded. One of the affidavits contained
the contested assertion that defendant demonstrated charac-
teristics consistent with a genetic disorder. After subsequent
appeals, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judg-
ment denying habeas relief and remanded for further pro-
ceedings, including an evidentiary hearing. After a review of
the record and an evidentiary hearing, the district court de-
nied habeas relief.
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2010 Hawkins v. Wong, No. CIV S-96-1155 MCE EFB DP, 2010
WL 3516399 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010). Defendant was con-
victed of felony murder, attempted murder, and robbery, and
then sentenced to death. Defendant claimed counsel provided
ineffective assistance for failing to investigate and present
mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of defendant's
trial. Defendant asserted such evidence would have shown
that he was genetically predisposed to alcoholism and mental
illness, and that his immediate family and generations before
them demonstrated extraordinary pathology and dysfunction.
A social historian could have testified about defendant's fam-
ily tree, which included many alcoholics, thereby indicating a
genetic predisposition to alcoholism. The court allowed an
evidentiary hearing on defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.
Morris v. Malfl, No. C 06-7409 SI, 2010 WL 2629738 (N.D.
Cal. June 29, 2010), af'd, 449 F. App'x 686 (9th Cir. 2011).
Defendant was convicted of carjacking and first-degree mur-
der. In a petition for writ of habeas corpus, defendant claimed
his due process rights were violated because he was tried
while mentally incompetent. He also claimed for the first
time that he suffered from paranoid delusions and schizo-
phrenia. During the penalty phase of his trial, defendant sub-
mitted evidence of sustained head injuries in the frontal lobe
of his brain, which governs impulse control. Defendant also
submitted a 2009 declaration from a psychologist stating that
defendant suffered from cognitive deficits and a genetic pre-
disposition to chronic psychopathology. The psychologist
had conducted neurological testing on defendant and found a
"'severe impairment of memory, judgment, insight, and other
cognitive functions needed to understand legal proceedings
and meaningfully assist counsel."' Id. at *15 (quoting decla-
ration). The court denied the writ of habeas corpus on the
basis that the new evidence did not raise real questions of
defendant's competence at the time of the crime, but issued a
certificate of appealability.
Creech v. Hardison, No. CV 99-0224-S-BLW, 2010 WL
1338126 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2010). Defendant was serving
two life sentences for murder when he murdered another
prisoner. He was convicted of this murder and sentenced to
death. Defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus but, at
his resentencing hearing, the court found that the aggravating
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factors outweighed the mitigating factors and reaffirmed de-
fendant's death sentence. Defendant claimed ineffective as-
sistance of counsel at resentencing for counsel's failure to
conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation. At the resen-
tencing hearing, a psychologist testified that defendant might
have a biological or genetic predisposition for violence. On
appeal from the resentencing court's judgment, defendant
introduced new evidence showing he had "'bilateral brain
damage that affected [his] insight, judgment and capacity to
exercise social inhibitions."' Id. at * 14 (alteration in original)
(quoting docket). The district court dismissed defendant's
claims and denied reconsideration, but issued a certificate of
appealability.
Allison v. Cullen, No. CV 92-06404 CAS, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82957 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2010); see also Allison v.
Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 924 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (publishing
only the judgment portion of the decision). Defendant and his
co-conspirator were tried separately in the home invasion and
murder of the victim. Defendant was convicted and sentenced
to death. Defendant applied for a writ of habeas corpus alleg-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to
investigate and present mitigating evidence during his trial.
While most of this evidence focused on defendant's traumatic
childhood, one expert witness stated that defendant might
have a genetic predisposition to alcoholism, substance abuse,
and mental illness. There was widespread alcoholism on de-
fendant's mother's side of the family, as well as depression
and alcoholism on his father's side of the family. The court
vacated the death sentence and granted relief for defendant's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated,
131 S. Ct. 2449 (2011). Defendant, who faced the death sen-
tence for murder, kidnapping, and sexual abuse, claimed that
counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to present
mitigating evidence. Defendant presented evidence of head
injuries and expert witnesses who testified that defendant had
neuropsychological deficits (some of which may have been
inherited) that prevented him from controlling his impulses.
The Court of Appeals found that counsel's failure to include
evidence of defendant's neuropsychological damage, along
with defendant's history of an abusive and traumatic child-
hood, constituted ineffective assistance. Defendant's death
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sentence was vacated and his case was remanded to the dis-
trict court. The U.S. Supreme Court later reversed and re-
manded the case in Ryan v. Detrich, 131 S. Ct. 2449 (2011),
in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
Ex parte Smith, __ So.3d _, No. 1080973, 2010 WL
4148528 (Ala. Oct. 22, 2010). Defendant was convicted of
three counts of murder and sentenced to death. The issue on
appeal was whether defendant was mentally retarded and
therefore ineligible for the death penalty. Defendant claimed
he had a genetic predisposition for mental retardation and
that five of his family members suffered from the same con-
dition. The trial court had held an Atkins hearing (pursuant to
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)), and concluded that
defendant was not mentally retarded. The Alabama Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court but remanded the case based on
another issue.
Keough v. State, No. W2008-01916-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL
2612937 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2010), vacated, 356
S.W.3d 366 (Tenn. 2011). Defendant was convicted of first-
degree murder of his wife and attempted murder of his
neighbor, and sentenced to death. He applied for post-
conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel for counsel's failure to investigate further into his
mental state. At the post-conviction hearing, a specialist in
addiction medicine testified that alcoholism was genetically
inherited and that defendant had a family history of alcohol-
ism. When the petition was denied, defendant appealed to the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. The court affirmed
defendant's convictions and death sentence, stating that the
additional evidence would not have changed the outcome of
the case. The Tennessee Supreme Court then vacated the
Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment after finding that a
state statute governing cross examination in post-conviction
procedures was violated.
Commonwealth v. Williams, Nos. 200001876, 200002869,
2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193 (Pa. D. & C. May
13, 2010). Defendant, who was sentenced to death after con-
victions for first degree murder and abuse of a corpse, peti-
tioned to seek a sentence of life instead contending that he
was mentally retarded and not death-eligible under Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). At defendant's post-
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conviction relief hearing, both the defense and the Common-
wealth presented expert witnesses regarding the issue of
whether or not defendant had mental retardation. Upon hold-
ing that defendant was mentally retarded, the court relied in
part on three criteria delineated in Atkins: subpar intellectual
functioning, impaired adaptive skills, and evidence of mental
challenges before age eighteen. Defendant also submitted
additional evidence that supported his claim of mental retar-
dation: brain damage, severe childhood abuse, genetic pre-
disposition to mental retardation, lack of maternal prenatal
care, and poor nutrition during defendant's developmental
years. Citing Atkins, the court granted the portion of defend-
ant's petition seeking to vacate the death penalty and impose
a sentence of life imprisonment.
Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG, 2010
WL 4386532 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2010). Defendant was con-
victed of kidnapping, rape, and murder, and then sentenced to
death. After several appeals, defendant sought a certificate of
appealability on four issues, one of which was whether he
was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his coun-
sel's failure to adequately investigate and present available
mitigating evidence. Mitigating evidence that was introduced
included evidence of brain injuries and a genetic predisposi-
tion to alcoholism and substance abuse. The court found that
it was not reasonably possible that the testimony of additional
witnesses would have swayed a change in a juror's vote, and
denied the certificate of appealability.
Darling v. Sec'y, No. 6:07-cv-1701-Orl-31GJK, 2010 WL
2471441 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1492 (2011). Defendant was convicted of murder and sexual
battery, and sentenced to death on the murder charge. After
numerous appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief,
defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel citing counsel's failure to submit mitigating
evidence of defendant's abuse and frontal lobe brain damage.
Defendant's evidentiary hearing provided expert witness tes-
timony that defendant suffered from neuropsychological cog-
nitive dysfunction, and that defendant's brain damage limited
his ability to inhibit his behavior. The court found, however,
that counsel's investigation of mitigating evidence was rea-
sonable. Although counsel did not know of the neurological
damage, counsel had presented evidence that defendant's
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father was an alcoholic and defendant had an abusive child-
hood. Furthermore, it was questionable whether defendant
had neurological damage. The writ of habeas corpus was
denied.
Turner v. Epps, No. 4:07CV77-WAP, 2010 WL 653880
(N.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 998
(2012). Defendant was convicted on two counts of capital
murder and sentenced to death. Defendant submitted a writ of
habeas corpus after his appeal and petition for post-
conviction relief were unsuccessful. One of defendant's
claims turned on ineffective assistance of counsel for coun-
sel's failure to present mitigating evidence during the sen-
tencing phase of the trial. According to defendant, counsel
did not investigate or present evidence of defendant's depres-
sive disorders, family history of mental illness, or genetic
predisposition to mental illness. The court denied defendant's
petition for habeas relief.
2011 Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487 (8th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 763 (2011). Defendant was convicted of
rape, murder, and burglary of his neighbor and sentenced to
death on the murder charge. After a number of appeals, de-
fendant applied for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to investigate
and present a more detailed social history. The medical back-
ground defendant wished to present included evidence of a
genetic predisposition to, and family history of, depression,
bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and brain dysfunction. The
court ruled that trial counsel's decision to forgo presentation
of this evidence was informed and strategic.
Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. de-
nied, 132 S. Ct. 401 (2011). Defendant was convicted of kid-
napping, robbery, and murder, and then sentenced to death.
On appeal, defendant claimed that trial counsel was ineffec-
tive in failing to conduct or complete an investigation that
would have uncovered mitigating evidence about defendant's
youth in a family context of physical and emotional violence,
drugs, alcohol, and sexual abnormality. Defendant submitted
a 1,000 page proffer that included assessments from a neuro-
psychologist and a neurologist. According to both experts,
the alcoholism and suicides in defendant's family very likely
played a genetic role in the mental and emotional health of
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defendant. Defendant was genetically loaded for substance
abuse, and he had inherited the diseases of alcoholism and
drug abuse. The court expressed skepticism about the genetic
evidence and its ability to shed light into defendant's state of
mind at the time of the crime. Ultimately, the court deter-
mined that the mitigating factors would not have made a dif-
ference in the actual outcome of the cases and affirmed de-
fendant's convictions and death sentence.
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). Defendant was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Defendant was
eventually granted habeas relief on his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim for counsel's failure to investigate and pre-
sent mitigating evidence. Evidence that should have been
presented included family members' criminal, mental, and
substance abuse problems, and defendant's medical and men-
tal health history (such as his epileptic disorder). The prison
warden challenged the judgment, and the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the judgment, holding that counsel had inves-
tigated the mitigating evidence.
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512 (Pa. 2011). De-
fendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a
1997 trial. Defendant was later granted post-conviction relief
on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Com-
monwealth appealed. At the 2009 evidentiary hearing, a fo-
rensic psychiatrist referenced a multi-generational pattern of
alcohol abuse in support of defendant's claim of genetic pre-
disposition to substance abuse. The court concluded that the
new evidence would not have affected the outcome. Defend-
ant's post-conviction relief petition was denied.



